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When a disruption such as a severe natural event occurs, the interdependencies between 
the infrastructure systems of society can lead to cascading events that can adversely affect 
community resilience. Resilience is the ability of a community to withstand, adapt and recover 
from a disruption, typically measured in terms of loss of life, injuries and economic cost. Studying 
the interactions between infrastructure systems is complicated by the fact that each system is 
rooted in a specific field and thus requires crossing disciplinary barriers. To overcome the 
identified research challenge, this dissertation employs distributed computational simulation to 
model and investigate the interdependencies that arise during severe disasters and the post-disaster 
recovery process. It focuses in particular on multi-scale interdependencies and their time-
dependent effects on community resilience. 
A distributed simulation framework that links each discipline specific simulator using a 
publish-subscribe data transmission pattern is proposed. The framework’s capabilities are 
demonstrated through a case study of multistory buildings that suffer wind-induced progressive 
damage. Data transmission is achieved using the Lightweight Communications and Marshalling 
(LCM) libraries. Building upon the LCM platform, a group of discipline specific computational 
models with disparate temporal and spatial scales are linked together to investigate the time-
dependent interdependencies that arise between water, gas, and electrical power systems during a 




interdependencies can adversely affect resilience assessments and adopting time-varying recovery 
strategies can lead to better resilience performance.  
An agent-based computational model simulating benefit fraud behavior in the wake of a 
disaster is used to demonstrate that distributed simulation frameworks can take into account 
broader socio-technical interactions in resilience research. The study not only considered the effect 
of micro-level disaster-caused demands but also meso-level social factors on criminal tendencies. 
The proposed model captures the key characteristics of post-disaster benefit fraud in detail, 
including the dynamic nature of the criminal process. The results of parametric sensitivity analyses 
can be used to achieve a meaningful balance between the loss of fraudulent payments and the speed 
of distributing aid for improving the overall resilience performance of communities.  
To provide a scalable, versatile, and user-friendly solution for natural hazards simulations, 
a new distributed computing tool called Simple Run-Time Infrastructure (SRTI) is employed. The 
high-level structure, data structure, and fundamental components of SRTI are comprehensively 
described. The applications of SRTI in natural hazard simulations are presented. The performance 
of an initial version of the SRTI is compared with the LCM. A cross-language simulation of time-
dependent resilience analysis of an electric power system is conducted to show the scalability and 
flexibility of the improved version of the SRTI, which reduces a user’s effort for composing a 
complex distributed simulation and better handle time management. Lastly, the choice between 












Communities are complex socio-technical systems. They consist of a number of 
infrastructure systems that are interdependent and continually interacting with one another, 
including the built environment, elements of social organization, institutional arrangements, and 
the economy. The built infrastructure contains buildings, bridges, lifeline systems and other 
physical systems. Social organization is the relationship between and among individuals and social 
groups, comprised of social power, leadership, community cohesion and crime sub-culture. 
Institutional arrangements, such as urban plans and disaster mitigation policies, and the economy 
are other infrastructure systems. These disparate systems operate and interact together quite 
efficiently most of the time, to the point where community residents rarely notice them on a day-
to-day basis.  
When a disruption such as a severe natural disaster occurs, the interactions between the 
infrastructure systems of society can lead to cascading events that can adversely affect community 
resilience. Resilience is the ability of a community to withstand, adapt and recover from a 
disruption, typically measured in terms of loss of life, injuries and economic cost. Because 
interdependencies can be highly influential, key US government documents published by the 
National Earthquake Resilience (NER, 2011), the Grand Challenges in Earthquake Engineering 




have called for the development of means by which to better address them in research studies. 
This, however, is complicated by the fact that each infrastructure system is rooted in a specific 
discipline or spread across a number of closely related disciplines. Achieving this goal is, therefore, 
difficult because of the challenges of transcending the disciplinary boundaries.  
The vast majority of sub-fields in natural hazards engineering and disaster science areas 
have evolved to rely on computational models. This common focus on computation provides a 
powerful means for reaching across the disciplinary boundaries. Yet, doing so is still complicated 
by the disparate data types as well as temporal and spatial scales that characterize the variety of 
models used in the different fields. For example, in a seismic scenario, the earthquake event may 
take place in seconds, while the recovery process may take place over months. Earthquakes may 
cause damage to a component measured in meters, while repairs to lifelines may be spread across 
an areas measured in kilometers. As discussed in Chapter 2, to eliminate this multi-scale challenge, 
many existing resilience studies are independent of time or have focused on only a single spatial 
scale, for example a single phase of a disaster, a specific structure or geographic area. Lack of 
consideration of the time- dependent and spatial interactions across different physical and social 
infrastructure systems may greatly reduce the accuracy and fidelity of simulations. 
Motivated by these needs, this dissertation has three main goals. The first one is to develop 
means by which to model and investigate the interactions between the different infrastructure 
systems of society during extreme natural disasters and the post-disaster recovery process. The 
second is to explore the effect of interdependencies on community resilience, with a specific focus 
on time-dependence. The third goal is to generalize the tools developed in this work into a 




connect their models and collaborate in new ways to study hazard mitigation and community 
resilience.  
1.2 Objectives 
 Along with the primary goals described above, several key research questions that this 
dissertation aims to tackle include: What types of disciplinary models (simulators) can be linked 
together to form a meaningful simulation representing a hazard event? What interdependencies 
arise during severe disasters such as seismic and hurricane events? How can discipline specific 
computational models ‘talk’ to one another? How can simulators interact over disparate temporal 
and spatial scales? These research questions are addressed by achieving a series of specific 
objectives as follows:  
(1) Review existing distributed simulation standards/platforms, and identify their limitations 
for use in natural hazards simulation. Compare their advantages and disadvantages, and 
provide design recommendations for new distributed simulation tools. 
(2) Model the spatial and time-dependent interactions that occur between critical infrastructure 
systems using simulators in disparate temporal and spatial scales. Investigate the 
interdependencies that arise between these systems during a series of seismic events that 
include short- and long-term recovery processes. 
(3) Address broader socio-technical considerations in resilience research, and conduct 
computational simulations to study the coupling effects between civil and social systems 
from both hazards engineering and social science perspective. Explore the combined effect 




cohesion, and crime sub-culture) on benefit fraud behavior following disasters, and assess 
the impact of post-disaster crimes on community resilience. 
(4) Develop a new distributed simulation tool, which is scalable, extensible and easy-to-use 
for natural hazards simulations. Investigate the data passing and time management issues 
across computational models in heterogeneous scales. 
1.3 Organization of the Dissertation 
A brief description of the six chapters comprising this dissertation is provided below.  
Chapter 1: Introduction. General information underlying the motivation and goals of this 
research is presented. The key research problems that need to be addressed are outlined. The 
objectives and organization of this dissertation are also highlighted. 
Chapter 2: Distributed Simulation Frameworks. This chapter systematically reviews the 
state-of-the-art in distributed simulation standards and tools. A distributed simulation framework 
that treats each discipline specific simulator as a black box subscribing to data from other 
simulators and/or publishing its results for others to use is proposed. The data transmission is 
enabled using Lightweight Communications and Marshalling (LCM) libraries. A case study of 
wind-induced progressive damage due to both the structural response of a building and external 
wind pressures is demonstrated. 
Chapter 3: Time-Dependent Resilience Assessment of Interdependent Lifeline Systems. 
This chapter describes the resilience assessment of three interdependent lifeline systems, i.e. water, 
gas, and electrical power systems, subjected to a series of seismic events. The simulation is 
comprised of a group of independent simulators that interact together through a publish-subscribe 




that arise between lifeline systems as the hazard and subsequent restoration processes unfold. 
Multiscale interdependency within the described hazard event and time-dependent effects of 
resource allocation strategies on community resilience are discussed. The ability of the framework 
to address the linkages that exist between civil and social systems is also presented. 
Chapter 4: Effect of Benefit Fraud in the Wake of Disaster on Community Resilience. 
In this chapter, an agent-based computational model, which includes a simulation environment of 
a community facing a natural disaster, fraudsters, and application inspectors, is created to simulate 
benefit fraud behavior following disasters. The proposed model considers the effect of both micro-
level disaster demands caused by building damages and meso-level social variables on benefit 
fraud, and estimates the cost to communities associated with these post-disaster crimes. The 
statistical data from the government reports in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina and Rita is 
adopted for the calibration and validation. 
Chapter 5: Simple Run-Time Infrastructure (SRTI) for Distributed Simulation of 
Community Resilience. This chapter introduces a new, scalable, versatile, and user-friendly 
distributed computing software solution, Simple Run-Time Infrastructure (SRTI). It is described 
comprehensively from the high-level structure to its fundamental components. The motivations, 
target users and development history of the SRTI are provided. The same case study of wind-
excited buildings suffering progressive damage in Chapter 2 is conducted using the SRTI v1.00.00 
to demonstrate the capabilities and compare the performance. Then, a cross-platform resilience 
analysis of a lifeline system subjected to an earthquake is built using the SRTI v2 GUI and 
executed through the SRTI v2.00.00 to show its scalability and flexibility. Lastly, a summary of 




Chapter 6: Summary, Conclusions, and Future Research. This chapter summarizes the 
key contributions and findings that can be drawn from this dissertation. Recommendations for 
future research in the area of interdependencies in community resilience and distributed disaster 
simulation are presented. 
1.4 Publications from the Dissertation 
Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 have been published as journal papers. Chapter 4 and the first half 
of Chapter 5 have been submitted to the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) journals 
and under review. The second half of Chapter 5 is in preparation and will soon be submitted for 
publication. Details are listed below: 
Lin, S.-Y., Chuang, W.C., Xu, L., El-Tawil, S., Spence, S.M.J., Kamat, V.R., Menassa, C.C., and 
McCormick, J. (2019). “Framework for Modeling Interdependent Effects in Natural 
Disasters: Application to Wind Engineering.” Journal of Structural Engineering, 145(5): 
04019025, DOI: 10.1061/(ASCE)ST.1943-541X.0002310. (Chapter 2) 
Lin, S.-Y. and El-Tawil, S. (2020). “Time-Dependent Resilience Assessment of Seismic Damage 
and Restoration of Interdependent Lifeline Systems.” Journal of Infrastructure Systems, 
DOI: 10.1061/(ASCE)IS.1943-555X.0000522. (Chapter 3) 
Lin, S.-Y. and El-Tawil, S., Aguirre, B.E. “Computational Simulation of Benefit Fraud and 
Community Resilience in the Wake of Disaster.” Natural Hazards Review, under review. 
(Chapter 4) 
Lin, S.-Y., Hlynka, A. W., Xu, L., Lu, H., El-Tawil, S., Kamat, V.R., Prakash A., Menassa, C.C., 




A Distributed Computing Software Solution for Simulating.” Natural Hazards Review, 
under review. (Chapter 5) 
Lin, S.-Y., Hlynka, A. W., Xu, L., Lu, H., Sediek, O.A., El-Tawil, S., Kamat, V.R., Prakash A., 
Menassa, C.C., Spence, S. M. J., McCormick, J., and Aguirre, B. “Simple Run-Time 
Infrastructure (SRTI): A Distributed Computing Platform with Extremely Low Barrier to 









2 Distributed Simulation Frameworks 
Distributed Simulation Frameworks 
2.1 General 
This chapter reviews the existing modeling techniques used to study the interdependencies 
that arise during severe disasters (Section 2.2.1), and the state-of-the-art in distributed simulation 
standards and tools (Section 2.2.2). A distributed simulation framework that treats each discipline 
specific simulator as a black box subscribing to data from other simulators and/or publishing its 
results for others to use is proposed (Section 2.3). The data transmission is practiced using the 
Lightweight Communications and Marshalling (LCM) libraries. A case study of wind-induced 
progressive damage due to both the structural response of a building and external wind pressures 
is demonstrated (Section 2.4).  Lastly, the advantages and potential of the proposed framework for 
modeling community resilience are discussed (Section 2.5). 
2.2 Background  
2.2.1 Modeling of interdependences in hazard engineering 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the interactions that occur between the various components of 
a natural disaster scenario are important to model in order to create a realistic assessment of the 
situation. Rinaldi et al. (2001) categorized interdependencies into four main classes: physical, 
cyber, geographic, and logical. Lee et al. (2007) identified five types of interrelationship between 




and Peeta (2011) categorized the interdependencies among infrastructure systems into the 
following types: functional, physical, budgetary, market and economic interdependency. Eusgeld 
et al. (2008) and Ouyang (2014) suggested that existing methods used to study interdependent 
critical infrastructure systems can be broadly grouped into several types: empirical, agent-based, 
system dynamics, economic theory and network-based approaches. As noted in Ouyang (2014), 
each type of modeling approach has its strengths and weaknesses, but it is clear from the literature 
that the two main classes of tools used in natural hazard simulations are agent-based models and 
network-based models.  
Agent-based modeling is a computational method that allows embedded agents, which are 
computational entities that represent the behavior of autonomous actors, to interact together with 
a view towards assessing their effects on the overall system. Examples of agent-based studies in 
the natural hazards field can be found in Reilly et al. (2017), Barton et al. (2000) and Schoenwald 
et al. (2004). The flexibility and capability of capturing behavior at the component (agent) level 
allow agent-based models to address many types of interdependencies and integrate well with other 
modeling techniques. This view is widely held as discussed in Ouyang (2014), GCEER (2011) and 
NER (2011). However, the key challenge in implementing agent-based models is managing the 
information that must be transmitted between agents and other simulation models. In many cases, 
the information format is hardwired into the simulation platform itself, which severely limits the 
ability of the platform to be extended to handle new situations and accommodate new models. For 
example, in Chang and Miles (2004) and Miles and Chang (2003, 2007), the agents were 
implemented in a Matlab/Simulink software environment which restricts future growth to only that 
particular platform. There is a handful of instances in the literature where more powerful data 




been used in natural disaster simulations, e.g. Fiedrich (2006), Jain and McLean (2006), 
Casalicchio et al. (2007), Eusgeld and Nan (2009), and Eusgeld et al. (2011). 
The network-based approach is mainly used to model interdependencies across lifelines or 
other network systems. Using this method, Hernandez-Fajardo and Dueñas-Osorio (2011) assessed 
the propagation of fragility across electric power and water distribution systems after an external 
perturbation. Guidotti et al. (2016) and Ellingwood et al. (2016) modeled the effect of water and 
electric power systems interdependencies on community resilience. The network-based approach 
employs interdependence matrices, which indicate the strength of dependency of one network on 
another at the component level (Ellingwood et al., 2016). While interdependence matrices are 
conceptually simple, their application to multi-network systems can be cumbersome to formulate 
because of their two-dimensional nature. In such cases, multiple interdependence matrices must 
be used to model the relationship between different pairs of networks, resulting in an exponential 
increase in the number of interdependence matrices with increasing number of networks. In 
addition, interdependence relationships must necessarily be simple ones, e.g. link (one), no link 
(zero) or partial link (between zero and one), because they are represented by a single entry in a 
matrix. Another key limitation of this approach is that it only applies to systems that can be 
simplified into nodes and links. In spite of their drawbacks and primarily because the basic idea is 
simple, numerous other studies have used interdependence matrices including Cimellaro et al. 
(2014) and Cimellaro et al. (2016).   
The above discussion indicates that common implementations of the two main classes of 
techniques used to model interactions in natural hazard situations have a number of drawbacks. 
With this as motivation, a new simulation framework that addresses these limitations is developed 




designed to enable the different components of a hazard simulation, each represented by a 
simulator, to interact together. Each simulator publishes its results (in a “message”) to a 
corresponding “channel.” Other simulators, which need the information, subscribe to the channels 
and receive published messages from them. There are no restrictions on how each simulator is 
developed or operates; for example, it could be agent-based, network-based, a Matlab/Simulink 
model or developed using some other methodology. Each simulator is viewed as a black box that 
subscribes to data from other simulators and/or publishes its results for other simulators to use. 
Modifiability and scalability are the key advantages of this methodology. In particular, it allows 
simulators to be replaced based on different theories or algorithms and permits new simulators to 
be added to existing simulation frameworks, allowing for increasing levels of complexity.  
2.2.2 Existing distributed simulation platforms 
Distributed simulation is a computational technique that facilitates interactions between 
simulation models regardless of the type of models employed or computing platforms on which 
they run (Fujimoto, 2015). The interactions in question pertain primarily to data communication 
and action synchronization. Several frameworks have been developed to enable distributed 
simulations in a number of fields such as robotics, manufacturing, war-gaming, and the Internet-
of-Things (IoT).  
Distributed simulation platforms fall into two general categories, standards-based and ad-
hoc. The former is typically geared towards general purpose applications and governed by a set of 
formal specifications intended to ensure successful execution of extensive, complex simulations. 
However, the broad and comprehensive nature of the standards complicates adoption by new users. 




adoption, but these proprietary applications prevent the development of truly open source 
platforms. By reducing the rules governing the development of new simulations, ad-hoc platforms 
are generally more straightforward to adopt and use and are therefore attractive for new users wary 
of the steep learning curve associated with standards-based tools. However, ad-hoc platforms shift 
the responsibility for handling various essential features of distributed simulations to the users.  
One of the earliest standards-based tools is the Distributed Interactive Simulation (DIS) 
platform (IEEE, 1993) developed by the US Department of Defense. DIS is currently maintained 
and developed by the Simulation Interoperability Standards Group (SISO,) and  documented under 
IEEE Standard 1278 series since 1993 (IEEE, 2012, 2015).  
High-Level Architecture (HLA) is another set of standards (IEEE, 2010b, 2010a, 2010c) 
for distributed simulation. It was also developed by the US Department of Defense. It is a set of 
standards that foster interoperability and therefore facilitate future simulation efforts. There are 
three primary components to the HLA specification: the HLA rules [IEEE 1516 (IEEE, 2010a)], 
the HLA interface specification (IFSpec) [IEEE 1516.1 (IEEE, 2010b)], and the Object Model 
Template (OMT)  [IEEE 1516.2 (IEEE, 2010c)]. The HLA interface specification defines the 
functional modes of interaction between multiple models and the framework’s Run-Time 
Infrastructure (RTI). The RTI is a middleware that must conform to the HLA specifications and 
provide simulation facilitation services such as time and data synchronization, bi-directional 
communication, and data exchange among various participating models to enable an HLA-
compliant simulation environment. All simulation entities (or objects) and interactions (or 
transactions) that are part of a composed simulation are defined in a common, pre-agreed format 
that will support multiple model interaction, data exchange, and reusability. HLA was originally 




applied for other purposes (Cayirci, 2013). A prominent alternative that also originates from the 
US DoD is the Test and Training Enabling Architecture (TENA) (Powell and Noseworthy, 2012). 
Similar to HLA, TENA uses a middleware to organize message communication. 
Distributed Data Services (DDS) is a middleware protocol and standard managed by the 
Object Management Group (OMG, 2015) that provides low-latency data communications through 
a data-centric publish–subscribe model. Its objective is to allow scalable, real-time, reliable and 
interoperable data exchanges. Like the RTI in HLA, the Global Data Space in DDS is the place 
where applications can share information by simply reading and writing data objects. DDS features 
a rich set of Quality of Service (QoS) properties that assure data reliability, ownership, durability 
and delivery deadlines (OMG, 2015). However, it does not have specific time management 
properties like HLA. DDS standards are open-source and have been applied in many fields 
including naval combat systems (Khaefi et al., 2015), remote systems control (Garcia-Valls and 
Basanta-Val, 2013), and Internet-of-Things (IoT) (Beckmann and Dedi, 2015). 
An example of an ad-hoc distributed simulation platform is the Lightweight 
Communication and Marshalling (LCM) (LCM, 2018). LCM is an open-source, seamless 
connection, language and platform independent, inter-process communication tool. It was 
developed and employed for modeling the information flow that takes place between robot swarms 
and is especially efficient for its intended application because it features low-latency and does not 
require a centralized hub (Huang et al., 2010). As such, data communication in LCM is not 
controlled by middleware, e.g. the RTI in HLA that imposes restrictive rules on data formats, 
thereby permitting rapid and straightforward modification of the platform for the intended purpose. 
In this chapter, the LCM are employed to build the distributed simulation framework. 




The key idea in the developed distributed simulation framework is that each component of 
a disaster simulation, e.g. a wind loading model or structural response model, is represented by a 
simulator that models its behavior. Since there are well-established simulation models in various 
fields, the biggest challenge of realizing a distributed simulation platform is finding a way to 
integrate these computational models together and managing the data transmitted between them. 
The Lightweight Communications and Marshalling (LCM) libraries (LCM, 2018) are ideal for this 
purpose.  
In LCM, the type-defined and marshalled messages pass through a channel, to which 
simulators can subscribe to required data from others and publish results for other simulators to 
use. The data transmitting method in LCM complies with the User Datagram Protocol (UDP) 
multicast (Postel, 1980) which is a low-latency data transport protocol. It allows LCM to perform 
real-time communication between various workstations with no need for a centralized hub or 
middleware as in other distributed simulation systems.  
Another favorable feature of LCM is that it is platform and language independent. Hence, 
the developed system can be extended through addition of new simulators provided by other users 
no matter what programming language they use provided they have a means of sending and 
receiving external data. Besides the simple message-passing feature, LCM also provides several 
tools to help users debug, record and inspect message traffic through the channels, e.g., lcm-spy 
and lcm-logplayer. lcm-spy is a Java implementation that displays live message traffic and allows 
developers to identify common run-time errors, e.g., invalid data and format mismatches. lcm-
logplayer is a playback tool to replay the actual transmitted messages. These tools enable users to 





The practice of LCM can be divided into three dimensions: type definition, marshalling, 
and communication, as its name suggests. First, all transmitted messages must be well defined and 
conform to the type specification of LCM, which is language-natural and similar to C. Then, the 
language-specific data structures, called classes, for all messages can be automatically generated 
and marshalled into a binding by the lcm-gen tool in LCM. In order to conduct valid 
communications, all distributed simulators must have the same type definition binding, i.e., the 
same message interpretations. Types of messages are checked by a prepending fingerprint function 
of LCM before they are passed across computers. Once all type checks are completed, the 
adequately defined messages are ready to be transmitted to the different channels where receivers 
can subscribe to the channels pertinent to them. By allowing uninteresting data to be skipped, a 
simple and efficient inter-process communication is then established. 
The concept behind the distributed computing platform is portrayed in Figure 2-1, which 
depicts an LCM setup for a wind-excited building event. Simulators pertinent to such an event 
(shown in Figure 2-1) are discussed in detail later. A disaster simulation may execute on a single 
computer or a set of machines connected to one another through a local area network (LAN) or 
wide area network (WAN) via the Internet. Simulators are decentralized and send or receive 
messages based on their needs. In this way, each discrete event simulation can be developed 






Figure 2-1. Distributed simulation platform for a wind-loading event. Each simulator runs 











2.4 Case Study: Application to Wind Engineering 
Analysis of a collection of multistory buildings that suffer progressive damage during a 
wind event is presented to demonstrate the capabilities of the developed framework and show that 
it can lead to meaningful results. Although this example comes from the field of structural 
engineering, the concept can be applied to address other more complex situations, as discussed 
later on in this chapter. As shown in Figure 2-1, the problem is represented by six separate 
simulators: Scenario Simulator, Wind Speed Simulator, Wind Pressure Simulator, Wind Load 
Simulator, Structural Analysis Simulator, and Damage Simulator. The framework, analysis 
procedure and data flow are shown in Figure 2-2. 
In Figure 2-2, the Scenario Simulator broadcasts information about the situation being 
simulated, specifically static information such as the location and geometry of the affected 
buildings. The Wind Speed Simulator generates time dependent wind speeds at each story of each 
building as a function of floor height. The Damage Simulator provides the damage condition of 
each building and assesses if windows are broken due to excessive wind pressures or story drift 
ratios. The Wind Pressure Simulator determines local wind pressures based on associated wind 
speeds and the damage condition of the windows. The Wind Load Simulator computes the 
equivalent wind forces applied at each story as a function of the applied wind pressures. The 
Structural Analysis Simulator calculates the dynamic response of the building and outputs the 
displacements of each story. These are then used to check for structural response-induced damage 
by the Damage Simulator.  
As shown in Figure 2-2, each simulator represents one part of the wind performance 
workflow, is executed on a separate computer, and connects to other simulators through the LCM 




and subscribed to by each simulator are listed in Table 2-2. The LCM channels and message flows 
are shown in Figure 2-3. Example Matlab code of the Structural Analysis Simulator using LCM is 
shown Figure 2-4, which includes the codes for initializing the LCM, subscribing, receiving, 
marshalling and publishing messages. 
 
 




Table 2-1. Types of messages produced 
Code Message Description 
 I A matrix containing scenario information (location and geometry of buildings) 
that does not change with time 
V(t) A vector of wind speed for each story at time t  
P(t) A vector of wind pressure for each story at time t  
F(t) A vector of wind load for each story at time t 
D(t) A vector of story displacements at time t 
C(t) A vector of damage condition for windows at time t 
 
 
Table 2-2. Messages published or subscribed to by the simulators  
Simulator Message Published Message Subscribed 
Scenario Simulator I - 
Wind Speed Simulator V(t) I, C(t) 
Wind Pressure Simulator P(t) I, V(t), C(t) 
Wind Load Simulator F(t) I, P(t) 
Structural Analysis Simulator D(t) I, F(t) 






Figure 2-4. Example Matlab code of Structural Analysis Simulator using LCM 
 
The computational problem is solved by incrementally stepping through time. Increments 
are typically applied in an Euler sense, where initial conditions are based on the previous time step 
and assumed to prevail during the increment. They are then updated at the beginning of the next 
increment. For added accuracy and to resolve situations that change substantially during an 
increment, iterations can be performed within each increment. For example, the effective wind 
pressure is a function of the condition of windows (broken or not) and the area of the opening, but 
%======== Add LCM and the message bindings to the MATLAB classpath ======= 
javaaddpath lcm.jar 
javaaddpath message_definition.jar  % compiled message definition binding  
 
%======== Initialize LCM ================================================= 
lc = lcm.lcm.LCM.getSingleton(); 
 
%======== Subscribe messages ============================================= 
aggre_scenario = lcm.lcm.MessageAggregator(); 
lc.subscribe('Scenario', aggre_scenario); 
aggre_windload = lcm.lcm.MessageAggregator(); 
lc.subscribe('WindLoad', aggre_windload); 
 
%======== Receive subscribed messages ==================================== 
millis_to_wait = 1000; 
msg_scenario = aggre_scenario.getNextMessage(millis_to_wait); 
m_sce = whlcm.scenario_t(msg_scenario.data); 
msg_windload = aggre_windload.getNextMessage(millis_to_wait); 
m_windload = whlcm.windload_t(msg_windload.data); 
% Based on the definition in 'message_definition.jar' 
% 'm_sce' contains variables:'m_sce.nbuildings', 'm_sce.buildinginfo' 
% 'm_windload' contains variables:'m_windload.step', 'm_windload.loads' 
 
%======= Calculate displacement ========================================== 
displacements = StruAnaModel... 
    (m_sce.nbuildings,m_sce.buildinginfo,m_windload.step,m_windload.loads); 
 
%======= Marshal messages ================================================ 
msg = whlcm.storydisp_t(); 
msg.step = m_windload.gstep; 
msg.step_time = m_windload.gstep_time; 
msg.buildings = m_sce.nbuildings; 
msg.disps = displacements; 
 






windows may be broken by excessive wind pressure or story drift. As shown in Figure 2-2, The 
Damage Simulator, Wind Pressure Simulator, Structural Analysis Simulator are therefore 
interdependent and iterate in a local loop in order to reach a solution in which window damage and 
associated pressures are consistent at each time step. Iteration stops when the damage condition is 
consistent with the wind pressure, typically within two cycles. The converged window status is 
used as the initial damage state for the first iteration of the next time step. As demonstrated later 
on, for small time steps, it is feasible to skip iterations and conduct the analysis in a purely 
incremental manner.   
2.4.1 Description of simulators  
Scenario Simulator 
The Scenario Simulator represents an urban community consisting of four buildings, as 
rendered in Figure 2-5 and shown in plan in Figure 2-6(a). Each building has a 42.67 x 30.48 m 
rectangular plan [see Figure 2-6(b)], flat roof, and an inter-story height ℎ of 3.96 m. The buildings 
have different heights and orientations. In particular, buildings B1 and B4 are 8- and 4-stories, 
respectively, and are orientated so that the incident wind impacts the long side of the building. 
Buildings B2 and B3 are 20-story buildings that are orientated so that the wind impacts the short 
side of B2 and the long side of B3. The geometry of all four buildings is summarized in Table 2-3 
and Figure 2-7, where B and L are the orthogonal horizontal dimensions of the buildings.  
Special moment resisting steel frames are used for lateral resistance of the buildings. The 
frames are located at the perimeter of each building, as indicated in Figure 2 6(b). Member sizes 
are summarized in Table 2-4 and additional structural details can be found in NIST (2010). For 




will resist the alongwind forces. With the exception of the outer three meters of each face, windows 
of width 1.2 m are assumed to cover the entire face of each building. As such, there are 20 windows 
along the short side and 30 windows along the long side of each building at each floor, as illustrated 
in Figure 2-8. 
 
 
Figure 2-5. 3D rendering of the four buildings considered in the case study 
 
 





Table 2-3. Geometric characterization for the buildings of the case study 
Building Story B (m) L (m) 
B1 8 42.67 30.48 
B2 20 30.48 42.67 
B3 20 42.67 30.48 





Figure 2-7. Geometry characterization of the simulated buildings: (a) B1, 8 stories; (b) B2, 





Table 2-4. Member sizes for special moment resisting steel frames 












1 W30×108 W24×131 W24×162   1.59 14.29 
2 W30×116 W24×131 W24×162   1.59 9.53 
3 W30×116 W24×131 W24×162   1.59 17.46 
4 W27×94 W24×131 W24×162   0 9.53 
5 W27×94 W24×131 W24×131   0 14.29 
6 W24×84 W24×131 W24×131   0 11.11 
7 W24×84 W24×94 W24×94   0 14.29 
8 W21×68 W24×94 W24×94   0 7.94 
B2 and B3 (20-stories) 
1 W33×169 W14×426 W24×335   0 6.35 
2 W33×169 W14×426 W24×335   0 6.35 
3 W33×169 W14×426 W24×335   0 6.35 
4 W33×169 W14×426 W24×335   0 6.35 
5 W33×169 W14×398 W24×335   0 6.35 
6 W33×169 W14×398 W24×335   0 6.35 
7 W33×169 W14×370 W24×335   0 6.35 
8 W33×169 W14×370 W24×335   0 6.35 
9 W33×141 W14×311 W24×279   0 7.94 
10 W33×141 W14×311 W24×279   0 7.94 
11 W33×141 W14×283 W24×250   0 12.7 
12 W33×141 W14×283 W24×250   0 12.7 
13 W33×141 W14×233 W24×250   1.59 12.7 
14 W33×141 W14×233 W24×250   1.59 12.7 
15 W30×108 W14×159 W24×162   6.35 14.29 
16 W30×108 W14×159 W24×162   6.35 14.29 
17 W30×108 W14×132 W24×162   9.53 14.29 
18 W30×108 W14×132 W24×162   9.53 14.29 
19 W24×62 W14×132 W24×103   0 4.76 
20 W24×62 W14×132 W24×103   0 4.76 
B4 (4-stories) 
1 W21×73 W24×103 W24×103   0 7.94 
2 W21×73 W24×103 W24×103   0 7.94 
3 W21×57 W24×62 W24×62   0 7.94 
4 W21×57 W24×62 W24×62   0 7.94 






Figure 2-8. Window location of the representative buildings 
 
Wind Speed Simulator1 
The Wind Speed Simulator generates the fluctuating wind speeds at specific heights 
through the following quasi-steady relation: 
𝑣 (𝑡) = ?̅? + 𝑣𝑗(𝑡) ≈ ?̅? + 2?̅? 𝑣𝑗(𝑡),      𝑗 = 1,2, … , 𝑛 (2-1) 
where 𝑛 is the total number of heights of interest, ?̅?  is the maximum mean hourly wind velocity 
at height 𝑧 , and 𝑣𝑗(𝑡) is the corresponding fluctuating component of the wind speed simulated 
through the model outlined in Deodatis (1996). The wind speed ?̅? , is extrapolated from 
meteorological data recorded at height  𝐻  through the probabilistic transformation outlined in 
Chuang and Spence (2017). This formulation allows for the explicit modeling of the uncertainties 
affecting parameters such as site roughness and observational errors. For this case study, the largest 
yearly meteorological wind speed is taken as 40 m/s, averaged over 𝜏 = 1 hour with a roughness 
                                                          
 
 
1 Prof. Seymour M.J. Spence and Dr. Wei-Chu Chuang contributed to the design and implementation of the Wind 




length of 𝑧 = 0.05 and a meteorological height of 𝐻 =  10 m. The roughness length at the 
site of the four buildings, 𝑧 , is taken as 2 m. In calibrating the model, the total duration of the 
wind storm is taken as 𝑇 =  4,021 s with a sampling frequency of 1.27 Hz. 
Wind Pressure Simulator1 
In this simulator, the wind pressures acting on the main wind force resisting system 
(MWFRS) and components and cladding (C&C) at each time step are determined based on the 
wind speeds derived from the Wind Speed Simulator and Enclosure Classification derived from 
the Damage Simulator. To estimate the wind pressure acting on the building, the velocity pressure 
at height 𝑧 above ground is first identified from the following equation: 
𝑞 (𝑡) = 0.5𝜌𝑣 (𝑡) (2-2) 
where 𝜌 = 1.25𝑘𝑔/𝑚  is the air density. The wind pressures for the MWFRS at height z are then 
determined as 
𝑝 = 𝑞𝐺𝐶 − 𝑞 𝐺𝐶  (2-3) 
where: 𝑞 = 𝑞  for windward walls; 𝑞 = 𝑞  for the leeward walls and sidewalls with ℎ the 
eave height; 𝐺 = 0.85 and is the gust-effect factor; 𝐶  is the external pressure coefficient defined 
in Table 2-5; 𝑞 = 𝑞 ; and 𝐶  is the internal pressure coefficient defined in  
Table 2-6. In particular, 𝐶  depends on the Enclosure Classification, which is determined by the 
Damage Simulator for each building at each time step. To estimate the wind pressures acting on 
the C&C, the procedures of the ASCE 7-16 (ASCE, 2017) provisions are followed. In this respect, 
the local wind pressures are given by Equation (2-3) while considering the following external 




if 𝐴 < 𝐴 ⇒ 𝐺𝐶 = 𝐺𝐶
if 𝐴 ≥ 𝐴 ⇒ 𝐺𝐶 = 𝐺𝐶
if 𝐴 ≤ 𝐴 <  𝐴 ⇒ 𝐺𝐶 = 𝐺𝐶 + 𝑔 log 𝐴 /𝐴
 (2-4) 
where 𝐺𝐶  and  𝐺𝐶  are the external pressure coefficients, 𝐴  and  𝐴  are the 
effective areas, and 𝑔  is a coefficient depending on the wall and pressure distribution under 
consideration (ASCE, 2017). Because only the windows are considered damageable in this work, 
only zone 4, as specified in ASCE 7-16, of each wall is of interest, as summarized in Table 2-7. 
Table 2-5. External pressure coefficient Cp  
Surface L/B Cp 
Windward wall All values 0.8 
Leeward wall 
0 − 1 -0.5 
2 -0.3 
≥ 4 -0.2 
Sidewall All values -0.7 
Source: Data from ASCE (2017). 
 
Table 2-6. Internal pressure coefficient Cpi 
Enclosure Classification Internal Pressure Cpi 
Enclosed buildings Moderate ±0.18* 
Partially enclosed buildings High ±0.55* 
Partially open buildings Negligible 0 
Source: Data from ASCE (2017). 
* The plus and minus signs indicate pressures acting toward and away from the surfaces 
 
 
Table 2-7. Effective areas Aeff1, Aeff2, corresponding external pressure coefficients (GCp)1,  
(GCp)2 and coefficient g for Zone 4 of a wall 
Zone Designed Pressure (GCp)1 (GCp)2 Aeff1 (m2) Aeff2 (m2) 𝑔 
4 and 5 Positive 0.9 0.6 1.9 46.5 -0.215 






Wind Load Simulator 
The equivalent wind force 𝐹  is calculated by multiplying the influence area 𝐴 and the  
combination of wind pressure 𝑝 on windward and leeward walls which gives: 
𝐹 = 𝐴 𝑞𝐺𝐶 − 𝑞 𝐺𝐶 − 𝐴 𝑞𝐺𝐶 − 𝑞 𝐺𝐶  (2-5) 
where the subscripts 𝑤  and 𝑙  indicate the windward and leeward walls while 𝐴 = 𝐵 ∙ ℎ  is the 
influence area. 
Structural Analysis Simulator  
The Structural Analysis Simulator estimates the dynamic responses of a building using a 
central difference scheme. In particular, a floor-wise lumped mass model is employed considering 
only the degrees-of-freedom (DOFs) of interest (e.g. the horizontal displacement at each floor). 



















where 𝐮𝐭(𝑡)  and 𝐮𝐫(𝑡)  are the vectors of the dynamically significant and secondary DOFs 
respectively; 𝐂𝐭𝐭 is the damping matrix of the condensed system; 𝐊𝐭𝐭, 𝐊𝐭𝐫, 𝐊𝐫𝐭 and 𝐊𝐫𝐫 are the 
stiffness submatrices obtained from the partitioning of the complete stiffness matrix 𝐊; 𝐌𝐭𝐭 is the 
lumped mass matrix; and 𝐅(𝑡) is the vector of stochastic forcing functions. Damping is calibrated 
by considering a modal damping ratio of 0.02 for each mode. 
Damage Simulator 
In this simulator, window damage and Enclosure Classification of a building are 




resulting in an opening in the wall – if the wind pressure or drift ratio exceed predefined pressure 
and drift capacities defined through fragility functions. For this case study, the fragility functions 
are assumed to be lognormally distributed with dispersion 𝛽 = 0.2. The mean value associated 
with the pressure fragility functions is taken as 1.8 kPa for windows on the windward walls and 
3.6 kPa for windows on all other surfaces (FEMA, 2006). A mean value of 0.02 is assumed for all 
fragility functions associated with drift induced damage (Sivanerupan et al., 2014). The fragility 
functions associated with pressure induced damage to the windward wall and drift induced damage 
are shown in Figure 2-9. It should be observed that in calculating the wind-induced dynamic 
response, only the alongwind direction is considered. Therefore, damage due to inter-story drift 








The Enclosure Classification is essential for estimating the internal pressure of a wind 
excited building. In this case study, three categories are assumed, namely, Enclosed, Partially 
Enclosed and Partially Open. The criteria necessary for satisfying each category are summarized 
in Table 2-8. In particular, a building is classified as “Enclosed” if there are insufficient openings 




in a “Partially Enclosed” building where there are sufficient openings in one wall to allow for the 
flow of air through the envelope while all other walls remain practically unbreached. The 
classification of “Partially Open” is assumed when internal pressure is negligible.   
 
 
Table 2-8. Criteria for enclosure classification 
Enclosure Classification Criteria for Enclosure Classification 
Enclosed 𝐴 < min (0.01𝐴 , 0.37𝑚 ) 
Partially Enclosed 
𝐴 > 1.10𝐴  
𝐴 > min (0.01𝐴 , 0.37𝑚 ) 
𝐴 /𝐴 ≤ 0.2 
Partially Open Others 
Note: 𝐴 = total area of openings in a wall receiving positive external pressure; 𝐴 = gross area of 
that wall where 𝐴  is identified; 𝐴 = sum of area of openings in the building envelope not 
including 𝐴 ; 𝐴 = sum of gross surface areas of the building envelope not including 𝐴 . 
 
2.4.2 Results and discussion  
The simulators outlined above are used to analyze the wind-induced response of the four 
buildings defining the community, and both incremental-iterative and incremental (where 
iterations are not performed) simulations are conducted. Unlike the incremental scheme, which 
directly exercises the simulators sequentially within the time step, the incremental-iterative scheme 
additionally checks to see if the Enclosure Classification changes within the step. If it does, then 
the updated Enclosure Classification is used to re-calculate wind pressure. Iterations are continued 
until all Enclosure Classification values are consistent for each building. In general, two iterations 
suffice to reach a converged damage state. Also, since Enclosure Classification changes are 
associated with irreversible damage, iterations are generally applied early on in the analysis 
history, meaning that later steps do not require iterations because the damage state has already 




computational time needed to address iterations is about 10% of the total simulation time. The 
increase is relatively small because iterations are only needed in the first few steps until the damage 
state settles down.  
The results of incremental-iterative and incremental analysis are compared to demonstrate 
the effect of local iteration loops on the accuracy of the solution. The roof displacements of 
building B3 computed through the two analysis methods are plotted in Figure 2-10(a) and its 
enclosure classification over time is shown in Figure 2-10(b). It is clear that there are substantial 
differences between the incremental-iterative and incremental schemes in the early part of the 
analysis associated with the rapid changes in enclosure classification. However, the differences 
decrease quickly and eventually become negligible. As such, the results of incremental analysis, 
which are faster to conduct, as discussed above, are used in the following discussions.  
The dynamic roof displacement responses of the buildings are shown in Figure 2-11 for 
the duration of the event. With respect to envelope damage, the windows of building B4 remain 
intact while those of building B1, B2 and B3 suffer substantial damage due to excessive wind 
pressures and story drifts. In particular, this envelope damage causes a change in Enclosure 
Classification for buildings B1, B2 and B3 from “Enclosed” to “Partially Open”.  
Figure 2-12 shows the 3D rendering of window damage for building B1. The accumulation 
of window damage over the height of buildings B1, B2, and B3 at some representative time steps, 
are shown in Figure 2-13 to Figure 2-15 (damaged windows are marked as light-colored blocks 
while undamaged windows are shown as dark-colored blocks). The result of B4 is omitted because 
the window damage rarely occurs in such a low-rise building (4-stories) for the studied wind event. 




walls sustain the majority of the damage due to the larger wind pressures associated with these 
areas.  
To demonstrate the feasibility of the developed distributed platform, Figure 2-16 compares 
the results computed using the distributed and integrated schemes, i.e. all simulators are integrated 
together into a single software package. As can be seen, the two responses are identical. While the 
distributed scheme may seem more complex to conduct than an integrated one with no change in 
accuracy, reformulating the problem into the distributed format with a publish-subscribe data 
pattern opens up new possibilities to modify the simulation in a decentralized way as discussed 








Figure 2-10. Comparison between incremental-iterative and incremental analysis results 
for building B3: (a) Roof displacement (b) Enclosure classification (1: Enclosed; 2: 


























Figure 2-13. Progression of window damage for building B1 at: (a) T = 0 sec; (b) T = 786 













Figure 2-14. Progression of window damage for building B2 at: (a) T = 0 sec; (b) T = 786 











Figure 2-15. Progression of window damage for building B3 at: (a) T = 0 sec; (b) T = 786 






Figure 2-16. Comparison between the integrated and distributed schemes - roof 




2.5 Advantages and Potential of the Proposed Framework for Modeling Community 
Resilience 
An important characteristic of the distributed simulation platform is modifiability. Since 
each simulator is self-contained (a black box, as noted earlier), it can be replaced by another 
simulator of different fidelity or one that uses another modeling technique or rooted in different 
theory. For example, the Structural Analysis Simulator can be exchanged with one that employs a 
detailed continuum finite element model instead of the floor-wise lumped mass model discussed 
earlier. The restriction for successful replacement is that the subscribed data (in this case the 
applied wind loads) and published data (in this case the horizontal displacement at each floor) 
remain the same. Similarly, the Damage Simulator could be replaced with a more sophisticated 
Wind Damage and Loss Simulator that allows for a more detailed analysis of damage associated 
with wind pressure, debris impact, and water ingress instead of the simple glass breakage model 
employed.  
 The framework is also extensible. The decentralized nature of the platform permits new 
simulators to be coupled to the simulation, growing it and increasing its complexity. For example, 




that occur due to glass breakage (assessed by the Damage Simulator) or airborne missiles 
(represented by yet another simulator). A third characteristic is scalability. The simulation 
framework permits a set of core simulators to be grouped into larger modules and connected to 
other coupled simulation frameworks allowing the scope to be scaled, with computational 
resources as the only limiting factor. The fact that various simulators can run on multiple 
computers increases the computational efficiency accordingly.  
These characteristics suggest that the simulation framework is inherently suitable for 
modeling problems that are richer in scope than the type of problem demonstrated in this chapter. 
Instead of modeling just the interactions between a hazard and an infrastructure system as done in 
the case study presented, the framework could be extended to incorporate the effects of other 
systems such as power, water and gas networks. It is also conceivable that the effects of recovery 
after the disaster could be taken into account. For example, a Debris Simulator could be coupled 
to the platform to compute the amount of debris resulting from the damage. A Recovery Simulator 
could then subscribe to this and other data to compute the new components and material required 
to reinstate the structure to its original condition and then publish recovery trajectories. The 
simulation platform is therefore well suited for modeling important aspects of community 
resilience.  
2.6 Conclusions 
In this chapter, a new distributed simulation platform was developed to simulate the 
interdependent effects that occur during natural hazard disasters. Each part of the disaster was 
represented by a simulator that modeled its behavior. Using a publish-subscribe pattern for data 




simulators to use and subscribed to the data it needed from other simulators. Open source LCM 
libraries were employed to manage the information traffic. The developed methodology was 
demonstrated through a case study of wind-induced progressive damage due to both the structural 
response of a building as well as external wind pressures. The natural hazard scenario was 
implemented on multiple machines connected to a LAN to demonstrate the distributed capabilities 
of the proposed method. It was shown that the distributed implementation gave results similar to 
the traditional integrated application and the advantages of formulating the problem in the 
developed format were highlighted. The need for iterations during simulation to ensure accuracy 
was outlined and it was demonstrated that iterations could, indeed, be performed within the 
platform. Key characteristics of the platform, such as modifiability, extensibility and scalability 
were discussed and it was suggested that the technique could be used for modeling richer problems, 










3 Time-Dependent Resilience Assessment of Interdependent Lifeline Systems 
Time-Dependent Resilience Assessment of Interdependent Lifeline Systems 
3.1 General 
This chapter describes a resilience analysis of three interdependent lifeline systems, i.e. 
water, gas, and electrical power systems, subjected to a series of seismic events. The simulation is 
comprised of a group of independent simulators, each of which represents one aspect of the disaster 
scenario (Section 3.4). The simulators are independent of one another, could originate from 
disparate disciplines, operate at different levels of fidelity and could have differing spatial or 
temporal scales. The analysis framework addresses the spatial and time-dependent interactions that 
arise between lifeline systems as the hazard and subsequent restoration processes unfold. 
Multiscale interdependency within the described hazard event and time-dependent effects of 
resource allocation strategies on community resilience are discussed. The seismic damage and 
recovery assessment of lifeline systems in Shelby County, Tennessee are presented as the case 
study (Section 3.5). The simulation results quantify how operability loss and recovery time may 
be underestimated if the interdependencies between lifeline systems are not properly taken into 
account. The effect of insufficient resources on recovery is investigated, and it is demonstrated 
that among the six resource allocation strategies studied, the time-varying strategies that are 
responsive to actual conditions on the ground had a better effect on resilience (Section 3.6). This 




effects on community resilience. The ability of the framework to address the linkages that exist 
between civil and social systems is also presented. 
3.2 Motivation and Objectives 
Modeling a disaster and the subsequent recovery effort is complicated by the differing time 
scales of the various phases of the process, that is, seconds or minutes as the hazard unfolds versus 
days or months as the emergency effort and recovery take place.  As a result, studies that model 
the multiple phases of a disaster within one overarching simulation are rare due to the challenge 
of integrating different simulation models with disparate temporal and spatial scales.  
A common assumption in resilience studies is to assume that a hazard occurs during one 
analysis step, that is, virtually instantaneously. In reality, the hazard unfolds in a finite amount of 
time. Accounting for how a hazard unfolds and affects infrastructure systems that can interact with 
one other can yield new insights into how interdependencies affect community resilience. This is 
especially important for situations such as a long-period disaster that overlaps with the short-term 
recovery effort [e.g., emergency response to hurricanes (Schmeltz et al., 2013)], short-period 
disasters interacting with an ongoing recovery effort (e.g., an aftershock affecting the recovery 
effort associated with the main shock), or multiple disasters occurring in a specific locale [e.g., an 
earthquake followed by a tsunami (Moreno and Shaw, 2019)] . 
Given the paucity of studies in this area, the objective of this research is to conduct an 
analysis that explicitly addresses the spatial and temporal progression of earthquake-induced 
damage and the postdisaster restoration effort. After a review of the literature, the methodology 




to two successive earthquakes is presented. Last, the applicability and limitations of the framework 
are discussed. 
3.3 Background 
There is broad consensus that the interdependencies that exist between the lifeline systems 
of a society can significantly impact the resilience of communities facing natural and man-made 
hazards. The classification of interdependencies and the various modeling techniques used to 
address them have been discussed in detail in Chapter 2 (Section 2.2.1). Numerous studies have 
been conducted to evaluate the resilience of communities subjected to hazards. The PEOPLES 
resilience framework (Renschler et al., 2010; Cimellaro et al., 2016) includes seven dimensions 
for assessing community resilience: population and demographics, environmental and ecosystem, 
organized governmental services, physical infrastructures, lifestyle and community competence, 
economic development, and social-cultural capital. Miles and Chang (2011) introduced a 
simulation model named ResilUS that was built on their previous efforts (Chang and Miles, 2004; 
Miles and Chang, 2007) and provided an implementation of the 1994 Northridge earthquake. The 
NIST-funded Center for Risk-Based Community Resilience Planning has developed the 
Interdependent Networked Community Resilience Modeling Environment (IN-CORE), which 
some studies have demonstrated on a virtual test bed community called Centerville (Cutler et al., 
2016; Ellingwood et al., 2016; Guidotti et al., 2016; Lin and Wang, 2016). The Civil Restoration 
with Interdependent Social Infrastructure Systems (CRISIS) model (Loggins et al., 2019) mapped 
services provided by civil infrastructure to the performance of social infrastructure systems and 
aimed to find restoration schemes that optimize the performance of social systems. As Koliou et 




multidisciplinary and multiscale nature of community resilience in time-varying resilience 
analyses. The methodology employed in this research is geared toward addressing these gaps in 
the literature. 
3.4 Computational Framework 
Chapter 2 provides a detailed description of the modeling environment and publish–
subscribe data transmission pattern used in this Chapter. Figure 2-2 shows how the various 
simulators employed herein interact together, and Figure 3-2 illustrates the publish–subscribe 
relationship between the simulators.   
 
 





The messages published during a disaster event are described in Table 3-1 and the 
corresponding publishers and subscribers are listed in Table 3-2. The run-time interface shown in 
Figure 3-2 manages the flow of messages, permitting the analysis to proceed in a decentralized 
and scalable manner. Although Figure 2-2 and Figure 3-2 show the framework for the case study 
considered herein, which contains three interdependent systems, it can be extended in a 





Figure 3-2. Publish–subscribe concept for data exchange 
 
 
Table 3-1. Message types published during a disaster event 
Code Message description 
I Configuration and information of test bed that does not change with time 
H(t) Hazard intensity measures at all locations of interest at time t     
DDi (t) Damage status of components directly induced by the hazard at time t  
IDi (t) Damage status of components considering the interdependency effects at time t 
Pi (t) System performance measures at time t 
RS(t) Total available recovery resources and constraints at time t 
S(t) Allocation strategy of recovery resources at time t 
Ri (t) Physical recovery status of components at time t 
IRi (t) Recovery status of components considering the interdependency effects at time 
t 




Table 3-2. Messages published or subscribed to by the simulators  
Simulator Message published Message subscribed 
Scenario Simulator I - 
Hazard Intensity Simulator H(t) I 
Direct Damage Simulator i DDi (t) I, H(t), IRj (t), j = 1, 2, … 
Interdependent Damage Simulator i IDi (t) I, DDj (t), j = 1, 2, … 
Performance Assessment Simulator i Pi (t) I, IDj (t), IRj (t), j = 1, 2, … 
Recovery Resource Simulator RS(t) I 
Recovery Strategy Simulator S(t) I, Pj (t), j = 1, 2, … 
Physical Recovery Simulator i Ri (t) I, S(t) 
Interdependent Recovery Simulator i IRi (t) I, Rj (t), j = 1, 2, … 
Note: Subscript i refers to system i. 
 
The scenario simulator in Figure 2-2 describes the basic configuration information, 
specifically the location and characteristics of utility facilities and the connectivity between them. 
Such information is published at the beginning of simulations and assumed not to change with 
time. Once a disaster occurs (in the disaster phase), the hazard intensity simulator provides 
information about the hazard, such as the magnitude and epicenter of an earthquake in a seismic 
disaster. Although this chapter only focuses on seismic events, the hazard intensity simulator could 
also provide information about storm track and intensity if a hurricane hazard were of concern. 
The simulator provides specific hazard information at all locations of interest to other simulators—
for example, ground motions at a given location. 
The direct damage simulator calculates the physical damage of components directly 
induced by a hazard regardless of the influence of other infrastructure systems. Damage can be 
evaluated using empirical models, fragility curves, or detailed finite-element models. The fact that 
the simulation framework does not care about the specific method by which damage is assessed is 
a key strength of the methodology. The interdependent damage simulator addresses the effects of 
interdependencies on damage occurrence. Interdependencies come in many varieties. They can be 




2001); physical, geospatial, policy, and informational (Dudenhoeffer et al., 2006); functional, 
physical, budgetary, market, and economic (Zhang and Peeta, 2011). The performance assessment 
simulator assesses system performance and is a key determinant for formulating a recovery 
strategy. 
In the recovery phase, the recovery resource simulator estimates the amount of resources, 
such as labor, equipment, materials, and budget, which can be used for lifeline restoration. The 
recovery strategy simulator allocates limited recovery resources to the systems based on a given 
recovery strategy, which may depend on the damage status and performance of the systems. The 
influencing factors and strategy for the allocation of recovery resources may change during the 
recovery process. Such time-dependent effects are a key focus of this research; the study of such 
effects is enabled by the distributed simulation methodology adopted in this work. Once damage 
occurs, the physical recovery simulator determines the reconstruction priority of damaged 
components based on their damage situation and degree of importance in the system, and estimates 
the required time for restoration. During every recovery period, the simulator further distributes 
recovery resources allocated from the recovery strategy simulator to each damaged component in 
order of priority, that is, system level to component level. Then, within every recovery step, the 
physical recovery simulator decides whether reconstruction progress advances forward or pauses 
according to whether a component has enough allocated resources. 
The interdependencies between the various systems must be considered not only as a 
hazard unfolds but also during the recovery process. For example, one component in a network 
system may have completely recovered from damage inflicted by a hazard but still cannot function 




damage simulator, the interdependent recovery simulator considers interdependent behaviors 
across systems and updates the recovery status and functionality of components.  
The simulators used in this work span different spatial scales: whole community, 
infrastructure system, and structural component. Community-level simulators affect large 
geographic areas (e.g., the scenario simulator and hazard intensity simulator) or represent decisions 
that address a large part of a community (e.g., the recovery strategy simulator). System-level 
simulators address physical infrastructure systems such as lifeline networks. The lowest spatial 
level pertains to components of the various infrastructure systems, such as residential buildings or 
pumping stations. The times scales considered herein also vary widely. As illustrated in Figure 
2-2, the time scale as the disaster phase unfolds Δthazard is several orders of magnitude smaller than 
the time step during the recovery phase Δtrecovery. The framework employed in this work allows for 
the possibility of subsequent hazards to occur—for example, an aftershock that occurs during an 
ongoing recovery progress.  
Shifts between the disaster and recovery phases are controlled by the performance 
assessment simulator, which is involved in both phases. This simulator judges the beginning and 
end of a disaster by interpreting the received damage messages and provides the latest system 
performance to the recovery strategy simulator. As shown in Figure 2-2, in the disaster phase, the 
performance assessment simulator calculates system performance based on damage status 
provided by the interdependent damage simulator, and in the recovery phase, it continues to update 
system performance according to the recovery status from the interdependent recovery simulator. 
The direct damage simulator also subscribes to the recovery status provided by the interdependent 




because it needs to know the latest recovery status in order to assess the capacity reduction in 
components that are not yet fully repaired when the next disaster occurs. 
The computational framework handles several types of interdependencies. Most 
importantly, the interdependencies between system performances and community-level recovery 
strategy are accounted for in a dynamic sense. In other words, recovery strategy can evolve 
depending on system performance at a given time. Second, because additional disruptions can 
occur during an ongoing recovery process, the ability of each component to resist new demands 
caused by subsequent hazards may be affected by damage from a previous event and unfinished 
rehabilitation efforts. Last, interdependencies can occur between components of different lifeline 
systems and must be accounted for. These interdependent relationships are shown in Figure 2-2 
by the interlaced lines joining the direct damage simulator and the interdependent recovery 
simulator or joining the physical recovery simulator and the interdependent recovery simulator. 
The extensibility and flexibility of the computational framework for modeling various 
types of interdependencies between disparate systems are the key strengths of the platform. For 
example, if new interacting systems are added, the interdependent damage/recovery simulators 
merely need to subscribe to the new direct damage simulators or physical recovery simulators on 
which they depend. No changes need to be made to other simulators in the system. The publish–
subscribe approach used in this work eliminates the need for using interdependency matrices, 
which are commonly used to specify the relationships between different pairs of networks. The 
limitations associated with using interdependency matrices are discussed in Chapter 2. 





Shelby County, Tennessee, which is close to the southwest end of the New Madrid seismic 
zone (NMSZ) has been used as a test bed in many studies. Dueñas‐Osorio et al. (2007), Adachi 
and Ellingwood (2008), and Hernandez-Fajardo and Dueñas-Osorio (2013) studied the 
interdependent response of water and power systems in Shelby County under earthquake demands. 
Adachi and Ellingwood (2009) assessed the performance of its water system under spatially 
correlated seismic intensities. Song and Ok (2010) analyzed multiscale effects on system reliability 
of the gas transmission network in Shelby County. González et al. (2016) developed restoration 
strategies that took into account the interdependencies between the water, power, and gas network 
systems in Shelby County. 
In a departure from previous studies, the computational framework developed in this 
Chapter was applied to Shelby County, Tennessee in order to demonstrate how it can be used to 
investigate earthquake-induced damage and the subsequent recovery progress, which itself is 
interrupted by an aftershock (first shock—short term recovery effort—second shock—long term 
recovery effort). The framework was applied to three interdependent lifeline systems in order to 
demonstrate its scalability. Unlike the aforementioned studies, which merely focused on one of the 
phases in a hazard event, that is, the disaster process or the recovery period, this study presents an 
overall simulation that addresses the disaster and postdisaster phases in an integrated manner. 
Another key advantage of the framework is that it naturally combines simulators that have 
disparate temporal and spatial scales. 
To capture the uncertainty in the seismic damage and the restoration process, Monte Carlo 
simulations were performed, and the means of the results are presented. Studies with 300, 500, and 
1,000 simulations were conducted to select a reasonable number of simulations. The studies 




1,000 runs) and 0.21% (500 runs versus 1,000 runs). Therefore, the number of Monte Carlo runs 
was set to 500.  
The following section describes the details of the simulators shown in Figure 2-2 and 
discussed previously. 
Scenario Simulator 
The scenario simulator provides configuration information about the lifeline systems 
considered herein. The systems of interest include the electric power system (EPS), water 
distribution system (WDS), and natural gas system (NGS), which are operated by the Memphis 
Light, Gas, and Water (MLGW) division. The topological configuration of the networks was 
adapted from Chang et al. (1996), Dueñas‐Osorio et al. (2007), and Song and Ok (2010). Figure 
3-3 shows the topologies and critical components of the power, water, and gas network systems in 
Shelby County. The gate stations in EPS and NGS and the elevated tanks and pumping stations in 
WDS are supply nodes. The 23 kV/12 kV substations in EPS, the intersection nodes in WDS, and 
the regulator stations in NGS are demand nodes. The intersection nodes in EPS and NGS and all 
directed arcs represent the transmission components. 
Hazard Intensity Simulator 
The scenario earthquakes were assumed to have an epicenter at 35°18’N and 90°18’W; the 
same assumption was made in Adachi and Ellingwood (2009). Ground motions designated RSN-
5223 (designated EQ1) and RSN-6536 (designated EQ2) from PEER (2018) were used in this 
study to represent feasible seismic activity. The ground motion records, which have a 0.01-s time 
interval, were scaled to peak ground acceleration (PGA) at the center of Memphis (35°08’N and 
89°59’W; i.e., 33 km from the epicenter). The PGA values were 0.202 and 0.341 g for EQ1 and 




(USGS, 2018) for earthquakes with a 10% probability of exceedance in 50 years (10/50) and a 5% 
probability of exceedance in 50 years (5/50). 
Ground motion attenuation was assumed to follow the model proposed by Atkinson and 
Boore (1995). Although the attenuation relationships were proposed only for the PGA, the model 
was assumed to be applicable to the entire acceleration record as plotted in Figure 3-4 and to 
depend only on the distance to the epicenter. Although the assumptions related to the hazard were 
made for convenience, the hazard intensity simulator can be adjusted in the future once more data 








Figure 3-3. Topological configuration of the lifeline systems in Shelby County, Tennessee: 
(a) electric power; (b) water distribution; and (c) natural gas system. [Adapted (a–c) from 
Chang et al. (1996); data for (a–b) from Dueñas‐Osorio et al. (2007); data for (c) from Song 





    
Figure 3-4. Assumed attenuation of ground acceleration (unit: g) for the earthquake with: 
(a) 5% and (b) 10% probability of exceedance in 50 years 
 
Direct Damage Simulator 
Direct damage occurs if the hazard intensity, as computed by the hazard intensity simulator, 
exceeds the capacity of a component. Four damage states are considered: minor, moderate, 
extensive, and complete. These states are irreversible and occur in sequential order. The capacity 
of each component is determined at the beginning of each realization in the Monte Carlo 
simulation. Lognormal fragility functions were used to estimate the capacities associated with 
different damage states for different types of utility facilities. The fragility functions were adopted 
from the Hazards US Multi- Hazard (HAZUS-MH) technical manual (FEMA, 2003), and their 
parameters are listed in Table 3-3. It was assumed that damage to EPS can be assessed from the 
gate stations and substations, which are the most critical equipment for the functionality of a power 
system (Shinozuka et al., 2005). The intersection nodes in all networks added for dividing the 
transmission lines and pipelines were assumed to be not vulnerable to earthquakes (Figure 3-3). 
As discussed in FEMA (2003), the rate of occurrence of pipeline failures per unit length is 
known as the repair rate and is computed via Equation (3-1), in which the unit for peak ground 




pipeline segment of length L can be expressed as shown in Equation (3-2), and the probability of 
pipeline breakage is shown in Equation (3-3) 
𝑅 [repairs/km] ≅ 0.0001 × PGV .  (3-1) 
𝑃(𝑁 = 𝑏) =
(𝑅 × 𝐿)
𝑏!
e ×  (3-2) 
𝑃(𝑁 > 0) = 1 − 𝑃(𝑁 = 0) = 1 − e ×  (3-3) 
Each link in WDS and NGS is divided into several segments of approximately one km 
length in order to consider the scale effect (Song and Ok, 2010). The PGV that corresponds with 
a 50% probability of pipeline breakage was used as the capacity of each segment. Buried pipelines 
may also be damaged by ground failure, for example, by liquefaction. Although such situations 
were not considered in this case study, they could be considered in the future by adding other 
specialized simulators.  
Table 3-3. Parameters of lognormal fragility functions for utility facilities  
System Components Minor Moderate Extensive Complete 
EPS Gate Station 0.11 (0.50) 0.15 (0.45) 0.20 (0.35) 0.47 (0.40) 
12kv/23kv 
Substation 
0.15 (0.70) 0.29 (0.55) 0.45 (0.45) 0.90 (0.45) 
WDS Elevated Tanks 0.18 (0.50) 0.55 (0.50) 1.15 (0.60) 1.50 (0.60) 
Pumping Station 0.15 (0.75) 0.36 (0.65) 0.77 (0.65) 1.50 (0.80) 
NGS Gate Station 0.15 (0.75) 0.34 (0.65) 0.77 (0.65) 1.50 (0.80) 
Regulator Station 0.15 (0.75) 0.34 (0.65) 0.77 (0.65) 1.50 (0.80) 
Note: All fragility functions for utility facilities are lognormal distributions with peak ground acceleration 
(PGA) as the engineering demand parameter. The corresponding median and lognormal standard 
deviation (β) are listed in the table, i.e., median (β); (unit: g). 
 
Component capacities are determined at the beginning of each realization based on the 




free. When aftershocks occur during the recovery process, the integrity of the segments has already 
been compromised by the previous event, and component capacities are assumed to be a function 
of the previous damage state. In this case, the capacities of discrete components were assumed to 
be reduced by 40%, 20%, and 10% for extensive, moderate, and minor damage states, respectively, 
and the reduction ratios for broken pipelines was set to 40%, that is, an extensive damage state. 
These numbers can be refined in the future if the time between events is specified and the direct 
damage simulator and interdependent recovery simulator are able to address sequential damage 
effects. 
Interdependent Damage Simulator 
Two types of interdependencies are considered at the component-level: functional 
interdependencies and spatial interdependencies. A functional interdependency indicates the 
dependence of one system (slave nodes) on the functionality or material flow of another (master 
nodes). For example, pumping stations in water and gas systems rely on electric power to operate 
pumping machines; electric power plants rely on the water distribution system for cooling purposes 
and for controlling emissions of coal-based power generators. In this case study, part of the power 
grid depended on the natural gas system to fuel generation units. Spatial interdependency is a 
situation in which components from different infrastructure systems are collocated within the same 
geographical environment, that is, the components have spatial overlap. There is generally mutual 
reliance rather than master-slave relationship of functional interdependency; that is, the damage 
state of both nodes is the same and is governed by the node that has more severe direct damage. 
The conditional probability of a slave node being nonfunctional given an inoperative 
master node can be seen as the degree of interdependency or the coupling strength between the 




to one, but it can be adjusted for other situations. All these interdependent relationships and the 
nodes involved are listed in Table 3-4. The interdependent damage simulator of each system only 
needs to know which nodes are the master nodes of its own components and subscribe to their 
damage conditions.  
Table 3-4. Interdependent relationships between EPS, WDS, and NGS 
WDS* - EPS EPS* - WDS NGS* - EPS EPS* - NGS 
NGS - WDS 
(Mutual) 
W2* - P28 P1* - W21 G6* - P18 P1* - G6 G3 - W12 
W3* - P29 P2* - W25 G10* - P24 P5* - G11 G14 - W41 
W4* - P14 P3* - W23 G12* - P44 P7* - G12 — 
W5* - P17 P4* - W29 G13* - P26 — — 
W6* - P33 P5* - W30 — — — 
W8* - P36 P6* - W35 — — — 
W9* - P38 P7* - W39 — — — 
W11* - P40 P8* - W42 — — — 
W12* - P26 P9* - W49 — — — 
Note: The left four columns indicate Functional Interdependency (Slave Node* - Master Node), 
and the rightmost column indicates Spatial Interdependency. 
 
Performance Assessment Simulator 
Ghosn et al. (2016) suggested that the performance measures of a network system can be 
divided into two categories: flow-based and topology-based measures. Flow-based performance 
measures are represented by the amount of supplied flow and the proportion of satisfied customer 
demand. Topology-based measures are calculated based on graph theory. An abstract graph 
representing a lifeline network consists of supply nodes, demand nodes, and several directed links 
that indicate the connecting paths from supply nodes to demand nodes.  
Due to a lack of information pertaining to flow capacity and demand, a topology-based 
metric, termed connectivity loss (CL), was selected for performance assessment in this case study. 




perturbation and is often used to assess the capability of a network system to withstand disruption 
(Albert et al., 2004; Dueñas‐Osorio et al., 2007). At the beginning of a simulation, each lifeline 
system is represented as a graph with nodes and links, and the original connectivity is calculated. 
As the analysis progresses, inoperative components are removed from the graph, then added back 
when they recover. CL of a network system with Ndemand demand nodes can be computed by 
Equation (3-4) 







where P0,i  = original number of supply nodes that connect to the ith demand node; and Pi = number 
of supply nodes connected to the ith demand node after a perturbation. The remaining connectivity 
(C) of a network is: C = 1 − CL. 
Recovery Resource Simulator. 
Recovery resources are quantified as a number of resource units. A resource unit is defined 
as the amount of resources and budget required for an 8-person crew with accompanying repair 
equipment to work 12 hours (working time per day). In all of the case studies discussed 
subsequently, the available number of resource units Rtotal for the entire county was assumed to be 
a fixed value during the recovery process. In general, it is assumed that all crews have unlimited 
expertise, that is, they can work on all lifeline systems. However, in last case study, the crews were 
assumed to have different skills, and the maximum number of available crews specializing in the 
ith lifeline system was denoted as Rmax,i. Clearly, the functionality of the social infrastructure—for 
example, the availability of able-bodied workers who were not injured or killed in the event—
affects Rmax,i. Although not accounted for here due to space and scope limitations, in the future, 




for example, accounts for worker injuries and deaths and for available funding needed to pay for 
repair crews. 
Recovery Strategy Simulator 
The recovery strategy simulator interprets the allocation strategy for recovery resources. A 
feasible recovery strategy is to allocate recovery resources to each system evenly regardless of 
their damage conditions, as stated in Equation (3-5), where Ns is the number of systems and Rk is 
the amount of recovery resources allocated to the kth system. This strategy (the EA strategy) could 
represent a situation in which information about the extent of a disaster is not known. In cases in 






Another strategy (the LA strategy) is to assign resources depending on the performance of 




× 𝑅 (𝑡) (3-6) 
where CLi = connectivity loss of the ith system. Alternatively, if the number of damaged 









The LA and DA strategies imply that the amount of recovery resources allocated to each 
system is not constant and changes over time t during the progress of recovery, reflecting the time-
varying characteristic of the recovery process.  
The recovery strategies applied in the example assume that systems that are more severely 
damaged and have worse system performance will receive more recovery resources. However, 
decision making during an actual disaster may be much more involved and may need to account 
for other factors, such as economics, politics, and societal values. In such cases, users could refine 
the algorithm in the recovery strategy simulator without influencing other simulators. 
Physical Recovery Simulator 
After a system is allocated recovery resources, the physical recovery simulator further 
distributes them to the damaged components. Once new damage to a system is computed, a normal 
distributed random variable is generated to estimate the required restoration time for each damaged 
component based on the restoration functions in the HAZUS-MH technical manual (FEMA, 2003). 
Uncertainty in the recovery process is considered. The parameters of the restoration function used 
in the case study are summarized in Table 3-5. The time step of the recovery process is taken as 
one day, and the required resources for all types of components are assumed to be one unit per 
day. If a damaged component has been allocated enough resources in the recovery step (day), then 
its repair progress will advance forward one day. Otherwise, it remains unrepaired. 
The physical recovery simulator distributes allocated recovery resources to damaged 
components using two different strategies: randomly (the R strategy) or in order of their priority 
(the P strategy). In the latter case, the recovery priority of the components in each network is as 
follows: supply nodes, demand nodes, and links/pipelines. To simplify the simulation, resources 




transportation on work crew routing (Morshedlou et al., 2018) is not considered in this study, 
although it could be incorporated through the addition of other simulators. 
Interdependent Recovery Simulator 
The same types of interdependencies, that is, functional interdependencies and spatial 
interdependencies, are considered during the recovery process by the interdependent recovery 
simulator. The interdependent relationships (master/slave) and involved nodes are listed in Table 
3-4. Although slave components may have completely recovered from damage inflicted by a 
hazard, they may not function until the master components they depend on have fully recovered. 
For example, the functionality of pumping stations in the water and gas systems depends both on 
their own repairs and on the availability of electric power. After simulation of the physical 
recovery, the recovery status and functionality of components is updated depending on the 
different interdependent behaviors across the systems. 
 
Table 3-5. Parameters of restoration functions for different components  
System Components Minor Moderate Extensive Complete 
EPS Gate Station 1.0 (0.5) 3.0 (1.5) 7.0 (3.5) 30.0 (15.0) 
12kv/23kv 
Substation 
1.0 (0.5) 3.0 (1.5) 7.0 (3.5) 30.0 (15.0) 
WDS Elevated Tanks 1.2 (0.4) 3.1 (2.7) 93.0 (85.0) 155.0 (120.0) 
Pumping Station 0.9 (0.3) 3.1 (2.7) 13.5 (10.0) 35.0 (18.0) 
NGS Gate Station 0.9 (0.3) 3.1 (2.7) 13.5 (10.0) 35.0 (18.0) 
Regulator 
Station 
0.9 (0.3) 3.1 (2.7) 13.5 (10.0) 35.0 (18.0) 
Note: All restoration functions are normal distributions. The corresponding mean and standard 
deviation are listed in the table, i.e., median (standard deviation); (unit: day). 
 




The simulators described in the previous section were connected together using the 
computational platform and publish–subscribe data transmission pattern described in Chapter 2. 
The computational framework was then used to investigate the effects of system 
interdependencies, multiple shocks, recovery strategies, and allocated recovery resources on the 
propagation of damage during seismic events and short- and long-term recovery processes. 
3.6.1 Interdependencies between lifeline systems 
First, a comparison of the performance of the three lifeline systems with and without 
considering the interdependencies between the systems is presented. Consider a seismic event with 
EQ2, Rtotal = 45 units/day, and crews with no limitation on their expertise. The allocation of 
recovery resources is based on the LA and P strategies. Figure 3-5 shows the damage and recovery 
curves of the three lifeline systems in terms of the average system connectivity performance. The 
dotted lines in Figure 3-5 reflect analyses that account for interdependencies, while the solid lines 
reflect simulations that do not account for interdependencies. 
Figure 3-5(a), (c), and (e) indicate that EPS is the system most significantly affected by the 
earthquake out of the three lifeline systems when interdependencies are not considered. Figure 
3-5(a) and (b) indicate that the performance of EPS is not significantly affected by 
interdependencies. Interdependencies are much more influential for WDS and NGS, as shown in 
Figure 3-5(c) to (e). The computational results show that WDS and NGS are more dependent on 
EPS, and the overall recovery time, in this case, is controlled by the restoration of EPS. It is clear 
that the operability loss and recovery times may be significantly underestimated if the 






Figure 3-5. Comparison of system performance with and without considering 
interdependencies during the earthquake and recovery processes: (a) damage curves of 
EPS; (b) recovery curves of EPS; (c) damage curves of WDS; (d) recovery curves of WDS; 








3.6.2 Influence of foreshock 
The influence of the foreshock is evaluated by considering a sequence of seismic events 
comprised of EQ1 followed by EQ2, Rtotal = 45 units/day, and crews with no limitation on their 
expertise. The allocation of the recovery resources is based on the LA and P strategies. The 
performance of the lifeline systems is indicated by the connectivity ratio, as plotted in Figure 3-6. 
Figure 3-6(a) and (b) pertain only to the main shock, while Figure 3-6(c) and (d) illustrate the 
outcomes of EQ1 (the foreshock) leading up to EQ2 (the main shock). Figure 3-6(a) and (c) 
indicate that the worst connectivity ratio of the lifeline systems is governed by the main shock, 
which is larger than the foreshock. However, the damage inflicted by the foreshock makes the 
lifeline systems more vulnerable to the later quake. As shown in Figure 3-7, the recovery slows 
down slightly in the long-term when the foreshock is considered, because the final damage after 
the main shock is more severe and there are more damaged components in need of repair, which 





Figure 3-6. Influence of foreshock on the lifeline system performance during (a) main shock 
without foreshock; (b) overall event without foreshock; (c) main shock affected by 





Figure 3-7. Influence of foreshock on recovery after main shock: (a) EPS; (b) WDS; and (c) 
NGS 
 
3.6.3 Influence of aftershock 
Consider a seismic event with EQ2 (main shock) followed by EQ1 (aftershock), Rtotal = 45 
units/day, and crews with no limitation on their expertise. The allocation of recovery resources is 
based on the LA and P strategies. Figure 3-8 shows the changes in system performance with an 
aftershock compared to EQ1 by itself. As shown in Figure 3-8(a) and (b), the aftershock induces 
additional damage and decelerates the speed of restoration despite being smaller than the main 
shock. Moreover, by comparing Figure 3-8(a) and (b) with Figure 3-8(c) and (d), it can be seen 
that the damage due to the aftershock is much more serious than the damage due to a single 




EPS in the case with EQ1 by itself is about 0.64, but in the case with the aftershock, the 
connectivity of EPS after EQ1 (aftershock) decreases to 0.42, as shown in Figure 3-8(b). 
 
 
Figure 3-8. Influence of aftershock on the lifeline system performance during (a) aftershock 
following main shock; (b) overall event (main shock followed by aftershock); (c) aftershock 
by itself (without considering the effect of the main shock); and (d) overall event involving 
only aftershock 
 
3.6.4 Effect of recovery strategies 
As discussed previously, two levels of recovery strategies are proposed: community to 
system (EA, LA, and DA) and system to component (R and P). As a result, there are six different 
combinations of recovery strategies. The schemes are designated by their names—for example, 




Consider a seismic sequence of events with EQ1 as a foreshock followed by EQ2 as the 
main shock. Resources Rtotal = 9 units/day, and repair crews have no limitations on their expertise. 
The focus is only on the connectivity performance of EPS. It is clear from Figure 3-9 that the three 
strategies that employ the P allocation have steeper recovery curves in the early stages of 
reconstruction. They also have better performance in the overall resilience process. Among the six 




Figure 3-9. Effect of different recovery strategies on the connectivity performance of EPS 
 
 
3.6.5 Effect of amount of recovery resources 
To study the effect of the amount of recovery resources, consider again a case with EQ1 as 
a foreshock followed by EQ2 as the main shock. In this case Rtotal varies and equals 9, 15, 30, or 




(DA-P) and worst (EA-R) strategies discussed previously are employed to maximize the contrast 
between them, and the results are shown in Figure 3-10(a and b), respectively. As expected, 
recovery performance improves as more recovery resources are allocated. Figure 3-10 also shows 
that the effect of limited resources is significantly more pronounced in the lower efficiency 
scheme. Figure 3-11 compares the effect of the amount of resources on recovery when different 
strategies are employed. Again, the less efficient schemes suffer more pronounced effects when 
fewer resources are available. 
 
 






Figure 3-11. The connectivity performance of EPS adopting different recovery strategies 
with different recovery resources with (a) 45; (b) 30; (c) 15; and (d) 9 units/day 
 
 
3.6.6 Effect of specialized crews and shortage of workers  
Consider a similar study with crews that have specific (not general) expertise—for 
example, a crew is only able to service a particular lifeline system. In addition, it is assumed that 
the accessibility of the lifeline service may affect the number of available workers in the area. 
Consider a seismic sequence of events with EQ1 as a foreshock, followed by EQ2 as the main 
shock. The DA-P strategy is applied, and three different recovery resource constraints are 
considered. First, funding is available to pay up to 15 repair crews per day, that is, Rtotal (t) ≤ 15 




each lifeline system, that is, Rk (t) ≤ Rmax,k = 5 (Constraint 2), where Rk (t) is the amount of recovery 
resources allocated to the kth system. Third, it is assumed that the number of available workers is 
positively related to the number of males aged 16 to 65 who live in an area with fully functional 
lifelines (Constraint 3). For example, if the DA strategy is applied, the Rk considering worker 








where 𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒16𝑡𝑜65  denotes the total number of males aged from 16 to 65 who live in 
Shelby County. 𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒16𝑡𝑜65  is the number of males aged from 16 to 65 who live in the 
census tracts with access functioning lifeline systems, including electrical power, water and natural 
gas system. The region of census tracts in Shelby County, as shown in Figure 3-12, and the 
demographics data of each tract are obtained from Hazus (2015). Table A-1 provides the number 
of males aged from 16 to 65 living in each census tract and the corresponding demand nodes of 
each lifeline system that are responsible for the area. 
It is worth noting that the third constraint is just an example of considering the mutual-
dependency of the recovery of lifelines and the socio-functionality of the community. Equation 
(3-8) is clearly an assumption made for convenience and could be replaced if detailed information 
about construction companies and the labor market is available. For example, if the information of 
casualties is known, the shortage of workers can be predicted more accurately. More importantly, 
Constraint 3 shows the potential of the proposed framework for coupling physical infrastructure 




Figure 3-13 compares the performance of EPS with different levels of recovery resource 
constraints. The figure shows that the resilience of the community is overestimated if crew 
expertise is not account for, especially in the period between 25 and 60 days. Also, the resilience 
of the community may be overestimated if the interdependencies between physical infrastructure 
and social systems are not adequately considered. 
 
 










A distributed computational framework was employed to model the interactions that occur 
between lifeline systems during earthquakes. Various systems were modeled using simulators with 
disparate temporal and spatial scales. The simulators were connected through the computational 
platform using publish–subscribe data transmission pattern described in Chapter 2. Shelby County, 
Tennessee, was used as a case study for demonstrating the ability of the framework to model the 
interactions between three lifeline systems. The effects of different recovery strategies on system 
performance were examined as the hazard unfolded and as the recovery process took place. The 
computational results quantified the influence of the interdependencies between the lifeline 
systems on the resilience of the community. 
Aside from the need to account for multiscale interdependencies, the case study pointed 




The seismic hazard considered in this work occurred in just a few seconds. Nevertheless, modeling 
the interactions that occurred between the lifeline systems during the event provided insights into 
how interdependencies among infrastructure systems propagate and provided clues as to how to 
improve their resilience. The ability to handle differences in temporal scales between a hazard and 
the recovery process is one of the key advantages of the analysis, as evinced by its ability to handle 
aftershocks that interact with an ongoing recovery effort. 
The case study showed that not taking system interdependencies into account will 
underestimate operability loss and recovery time. It was also shown that that, within the constraints 
of this research, the strategy of recovery resource allocation had a great impact on community 
resilience. The impact was exacerbated when resources were insufficient. Among the six resource 
allocation strategies studied, the ones that adjusted based on damage/reconstruction states 
enhanced resilience. This points to the necessity of maximizing a community’s ability to have 
good information flow after a disaster. In other words, the hardening of monitoring and 
communications systems and making them more damage-tolerant is an effective way to increase 
community resilience. This, of course, can only be achieved by building, prior to the event, 
institutional relationships that will foster cooperation between the various public and private 
players that would be involved in response, restoration, and recovery. 
A limitation of this work lies in some of the assumptions and simplifications made. For 
example, the effect of delays due to bad weather conditions and traffic blockages or the effect of 
limited construction materials on the available number of resource units was not considered. 
Although these omissions and simplifications may influence the specific results presented in this 
study, the framework’s flexibility and extensibility permit it to address them in the future through 








 CHAPTER 4 
4 Effect of Benefit Fraud in the Wake of Disaster on Community Resilience 
Effect of Benefit Fraud in the Wake of Disaster on Community Resilience 
4.1 General 
The monetary assistance provided for disaster relief creates opportunities for fraudulent 
behavior. Historical records have shown that the loss of recovery funds due to improper and 
fraudulent payments could reach hundreds of millions of dollars per event, siphoning support away 
from those who need it the most and potentially slowing down the economic resurgence of a 
disaster-stricken community (Section 4.2). In this chapter, an agent-based computational model, 
which includes a simulation environment of a community facing a natural disaster, fraudsters, and 
application inspectors, is created to simulate benefit fraud behavior following disasters (Section 
4.4). The proposed model considers the effect of both micro-level disaster demands caused by 
building damages and meso-level social variables on benefit fraud, and estimates the cost to 
communities associated with these post-disaster crimes. The statistical data from the government 
reports in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina and Rita is adopted for the calibration and validation 
(Section 4.5). Parametric sensitivity analyses quantify how reducing application review errors, 
decreasing disaster demands, and increasing oversight can help lessen the losses caused by benefit 
fraud (Section 4.6). They demonstrate how computational simulation can be used to achieve a 
meaningful balance between the loss of fraudulent payments and the speed of distributing aid in 




4.2 Motivation  
The monetary assistance provided by the government and other organizations in the 
aftermath of large-scale disasters is enormous. While quick disbursement of this aid can reduce 
human suffering and enable rapid recovery, the abundance of resources combined with emergent 
conditions create opportunities for disaster-related fraud, which can reach millions of dollars per 
event. According to the U.S. Government’s Accountability Office (GAO, 2006a), the amount of 
potentially fraudulent assistance in Hurricanes Katrina and Rita through FEMA’s Individuals and 
Households Program (IHP) was estimated to be between $600 million to $1.4 billion, or 10 to 22 
percent of the provided aid. For hurricane Sandy, the numbers are smaller, but still significant: $39 
million, or 3 percent of the provided monetary assistance (GAO, 2014). 
As discussed later on, a number of researchers have studied the influence of disasters and 
subsequent social conditions on the outcome of crime. However, these studies often addressed 
criminal behavior at the meso-scale, for example, the change in crime rate at the county level. They 
also examined the presumed emergence of social solidarity in a community that stopped the 
majority of crimes from happening, but most did not consider the temporal nature of the problem 
(Aguirre and Lane, 2019). Importantly, from the perspective of this study, the majority of existing 
studies did not consider post-disaster crime in the context of long-term community reconstruction 
and recovery. 
Focusing specifically on benefit fraud, the objective of this study is to address the identified 
gaps in the literature through computational simulation. Benefit fraud is a common type of post-
disaster crime where individuals seek to enrich themselves by filing false damage claims. By 
explicitly considering the temporal nature of the problem and employing an agent-based 




account disaster demands and social variables at both the meso- (community) and micro- 
(individual) levels. After calibration using data from the Hurricane Katrina and Rita events, the 
proposed model is used to conduct a parametric study to investigate the effects of key variables on 
the extent of and propensity for post-disaster benefit fraud. 
4.3 Background 
Disaster-related crime research is not a central research topic in the literature in disaster 
science. Zahran et al. (2009) considered baseline demographic variables, i.e., population and 
economic capital, social order variables, i.e., law enforcement and nonprofit density, and disaster 
variables, i.e., disaster frequency and presidential disaster declarations, for modeling crime 
outcomes in Florida. Prelog (2016) used disaster and social indicators, including disaster counts, 
property damage, crop damage, injuries, income inequality, racial heterogeneity, and ethnic 
heterogeneity to model the relationship between natural disasters and crime in the United States. 
Spencer (2017) considered the impact of unemployment and income when estimating the effect of 
hurricanes on criminal activities. Breetzke et al. (2018) examined the effect of socio-economic 
deprivation, ethnic heterogeneity, residential mobility, and collective efficacy on crime variability 
in post-earthquake Christchurch using ten community-level measures. A systematic review of 
social vulnerability indicators in disasters can be found in Fatemi et al. (2017). The surveyed 
studies indicate that the current state-of-the-art seeks to quantify the influence of post-impact crime 
through statistical or equation-based methods that employ meso-level variables. This study takes 
a different approach based on simulation.    
Agent-based modeling (ABM) is selected as the primary computational tool in order to 




established computational method that has found broad applicability in social science (Epstein, 
2006; Fang et al., 2016b; Fang et al., 2016a). The application of ABM in criminology arose in the 
early 2000s. Groff et al. (2019) provided a systematic review of studies that have used ABM to 
model urban crime, such as burglary (Johnson et al., 2007; Malleson et al., 2010), drug crime (Dray 
et al., 2008) , and robbery (Groff, 2007). ABM also has been applied to studying financial crimes, 
e.g., fraudulent activities in public service delivery programs (Kim et al., 2013) and tax evasion 
(Hokamp, 2014). To the knowledge of the authors, no studies have used ABM to investigate crime 
in the wake of disasters as done herein. By necessity, modeling post-disaster crime depends on 
modeling disaster demands, or the challenges posed by the effects of the disaster, which is another 
innovation in this study that allows considering the effects of crime. 
4.4 Methodology 
The process of establishing an agent-based model is divided into the following steps. First, 
a conceptual model is formalized based on the observed phenomena and the knowledge acquired 
from previous disaster studies and existing theories in criminology. Second, a computational 
model, which includes the simulation environment, agents, and their behavior rules, is created for 
interpreting the conceptual model. After verifying that the constructed computational model 
adequately represents the properties of the conceptual model, the third step is to calibrate the 
computational model with empirical data. Finally, artificial experiments (parametric sensitivity 
analyses) are conducted to study the effects of various variables. 




Before creating a computational model, it is necessary to formalize a conceptual model that 
adequately represents the situation of interest and captures the theoretical propositions to be 
explored. The proposed conceptual model builds upon established criminology theories. These 
theories are briefly reviewed next and key aspects are selected to explain social phenomena 
observed in disasters. The following discussion is only limited to the main ideas that underlie the 
proposed model. Additional details about the theories can be found in Miller et al. (2011) and 
Tibbetts (2018). 
The rational choice theory [RCT] (Cornish and Clarke, 1986) is a common theory used to 
explain criminal behavior. It proposes that the choice to commit crime is based upon the balance 
of risks, rewards, and efforts perceived by a potential criminal. As a sub-field of RCT, the routine 
activity theory [RAT] (Cohen and Felson, 1979) is more focused on the available opportunity. In 
it, criminal activity is conditioned upon convergence of: 1) suitable targets, 2) motivated offenders, 
and 3) a dearth of guardians. It posits that the absence of any one of these conditions will likely 
prevent the occurrence of crime. The social disorganization theory [SDT] (Shaw and McKay, 
1942) and the therapeutic community hypothesis [TCH] (Fritz, 1996) suggest that crime rate is a 
function of social conditions. The former suggests that certain ecological characteristics and 
criminal subcultures of the surrounding area, e.g., high unemployment and low law enforcement 
density, may increase the likelihood of individuals committing criminal activities. In contrast, the 
latter theory predicts that illegal activities will decrease in the aftermath of disasters because 
community cohesion and cooperation rise in the aftermath of disasters. Yet another theory, the 
social learning theory [SLT] (Jeffery, 1965) proposes that criminal behavior is learned and 
reinforced by previous actions, so that the propensity of being a repeat offender increases with 




The most useful summary of these ideas is encapsulated in RAT. According to it, the roles 
involved in a criminal incident could be divided into three types: targets, offenders, and guardians. 
In the case of benefit fraud after disasters, the organizations distributing financial assistance are 
targets that may be scammed by fraudulent applicants (offenders). The government investigators 
who specialize in detecting fraud crimes are the guardians. Table 4-1 outlines the selected decision 
factors in a benefit fraud event as inspired by the criminology theories reviewed above and how 
those factors translate into implementation considerations within the proposed conceptual model. 
 
Table 4-1. Potential decision factors of benefit fraud and their consideration within the 
proposed conceptual model 
Criminology 
theory 
Decision factors   Implementation considerations in conceptual model 
RCT Financial demands 
attributed to the disaster 
The repair cost attributed to the disaster. Also of 
importance is the elapsed time after the disaster 
without the arrival of assistance from outside the 
community. 
Effort and skill needed to 
commit benefit fraud 
Probability of an applicant completing a fraudulent 
application for financial assistance. 
The perceived risks of 
crime 
Number of applicants sanctioned and the extent of 
punishment for the crime. 
RAT Availability of victims and 
their vulnerability 
Insufficient oversight or weak application review 
process of victims (such as government or 
organizations providing aid) 
Guardian strength Number and diligence of fraud investigators  
SDT 
 
Extent of criminal 
subculture 
The criminal subculture influences the propensity of 
applicants toward committing fraud, where people 
construct a normative and value consensus that makes 
criminal behavior appropriate 
TCH Extent of community 
cohesion 
Community cohesion influences the propensity of 
applicants toward committing fraud. 
SLT Repeat offending Success in previous fraud efforts may increase the 
propensity of recommitting benefit fraud. It may also 
indicate the presence of a criminal career in the 
deviant, where repeat crime becomes an accepted way 





4.4.2 Constructing the computational agent-based model 
Scope and Assumptions 
The proposed conceptual model addresses a situation in which benefit fraud may occur 
when the government or other organizations distribute monetary assistance to homeowners for 
house reconstruction or relocation after severe natural disasters. Potential claimants are the 
householders residing in the affected area, and benefit fraud refers to the householders obtaining 
or attempting to obtain financial assistance from the grantor but having no entitlement to do so, 
e.g., not having a covered loss as a direct result of the disaster, or duplicating the claims for 
supernumerary benefits. Benefit fraud committed by non-residential criminals, organized groups 
and identity thieves is not considered in this study and is left to future research that could include 
more types of agents. 
The inventory of damaged residential buildings and demographic information of 
homeowners are assumed to be known at the beginning of a simulation. The temporal unit used to 
update an agent’s activity and decision-making is one day. The simulation starts when the first aid 
application is accepted and ends when all applications have been reviewed and related 
investigations have concluded. 
Agents and Interaction  
The simulation of benefit fraud in a disaster is an abstract representation of a hypothesized 
dynamic relationship between three types of agents: 1) householders in the disaster area, 2) 
application reviewers in the organizations that distribute financial assistance, and 3) government 
special investigators, corresponding to the three key components of RAT, i.e., potential offenders, 
targets, and guardians, in a benefit fraud event. The interactions between the agents is illustrated 




householders and application reviewers. A householder agent decides whether to submit an 
application for financial assistance based on the disaster-caused loss and other social impact 
factors. The probability that a householder agent will submit duplicate/fraudulent applications 
represents the propensity toward committing fraud. The ability of reviewers to notice suspicious 
claims represents the vulnerability of the target. Investigator agents provide fraud deterrence and 
guardianship by investigating suspicious applicants. Claims by fraudulent agents are frozen once 
they are discovered by investigator agents.  
 
Figure 4-1. Interactions between the agents 
 
 
The analysis procedure of the ABM simulation is shown in Figure 3-2. The householder’s 
ecological characteristics, e.g. community cohesion and criminal subcultures, and the 
householder’s loss caused by the disaster are the initial inputs to the simulation scenario. This 
information can be collected by other government agencies in the aftermath of disasters, so 
investigator agents can make an informed decisions about the likelihood that applications are 




without further investigations, 2) rejected as ineligible or incomplete without investigations, 3) 
approved and paid by the reviewers but determined as fraud by the investigators in the aftermath, 
and 4) seen as suspicious by the reviewers and determined as fraud by the investigators before 










Decision-making rules  
The decision process for a householder agent is illustrated in Figure 4-3. Each agent decides 
whether to submit an application at every step and may submit more than one application during 
a simulation, i.e., duplicate applications. In Figure 4-3, the probability of a householder agent 
completing an application at specific time, Pc, characterizes the probability of householders 
submitting applications in different post-disaster phases. The probability of submitting 
duplicate/fraudulent applications, denoted as Pf, used to estimate the crime propensity, is described 
in the next section. 
 
 






The behavior rules for a reviewer agent are shown in Figure 4-4. Reviewers examine 
applications in the order of submission. Applications that are ineligible or incomplete are rejected 
and canceled. Eligible applications are either awarded directly or sent to investigators for further 
investigation. Two types of application review errors are considered here to represent the 
vulnerability of targets in RAT. Type I error, rv_errortype1, refers to judging a justified application 
to be suspicious, and Type II error, rv_errortype2, indicates the case of approving a fraudulent 
application without further investigations. 
 
The decision rules for investigator agents are presented in Figure 4-5. As with reviewer 
agents, there may be two types of errors in the investigation results, i.e., judge a justified 
application as a fraud (inv_errortype1) or approve a fraudulent application (inv_errortype2). In 
addition to the suspicious cases listed by the reviewers, investigators may investigate applications 
already approved by the reviewers. Investigators will provide the results of the investigation to the 
reviewers and applicants recommended for sanctioning cannot submit further applications. The 











Figure 4-5. Decision-making process of investigator agents 
 
 




The probability that a householder will submit duplicate/fraudulent applications is denoted 
Pf in Figure 4-3. Pf  is a direct function of the social and disaster-related variables at each time step 
of the analysis, specifically environmental (meso) and individual (micro) level variables. The 
former pertains to the effect of the environment within which agents take actions and the latter to 
the individual characteristics of each householder agent. Based on SDT and TCH, two meso-level 
variables, CC and CS, are used to consider the effect of community cohesion and criminal 
subculture, respectively. The measures employed in this work for the quantification of these two 
variables are listed in Table 4-2 and Table 4-3. The micro-level variables are disaster-caused 
demands (DD) and personal experience with fraud (E). DD represents the motivation of potential 
offenders to commit frauds in the wake of disaster (RCT and RAT), and E characterizes the 
learning effect of SLT.  
The probability that a householder agent will submit a duplicate/fraudulent application at 
time t, Pf,t, is proposed to be an additive combination of these variables (weighted) as shown in 
Equation (3-1). 
𝑃 , = 𝑃 ∙(𝑤 ∙ 𝐶𝐶 + 𝑤 ∙ 𝐶𝑆 +  𝑤 ∙ 𝐷𝐷 + 𝑤 ∙ 𝐸 )
s. t.                   0 ≤ 𝑃 , ≤ 1
0 ≤ 𝑃 ≤ 1
−1 ≤ 𝐶𝐶 , 𝐶𝑆 , 𝐷𝐷 , 𝐸 ≤ 1
𝑤 , 𝑤 , 𝑤 , 𝑤 ≥ 0
 (4-1) 
where Pi is the given initial probability for a householder to submit a duplicate/fraudulent claim 
(input parameter); 𝐶𝐶 , 𝐶𝑆 , 𝐷𝐷 , 𝐸  are the quantified values for the effects of community 
cohesion, criminal subculture, disaster-caused demands, and the agent’s personal experience at 
time t, respectively. The positive quantified values indicate the stimulative influences on the 




𝑤 , 𝑤 , 𝑤   are the corresponding weights for each variable. Calibration of these variables is 
discussed later on in the following section. It is worth noting that there are no interaction terms in 
Equation 1, i.e. assuming no correlation between 𝐶𝐶 , 𝐶𝑆 , 𝐷𝐷 , 𝐸 . However, different forms of 
equation or model can be adopted to estimate the Pf,t in the proposed ABM. 
 
Table 4-2. Meso-level community cohesion variables 
Variables Measures 
Racial heterogeneity Herfindahl index (Kwoka, 1985): the sum of squared proportions of 
different racial categories. 
Ethnic heterogeneity Herfindahl index (Kwoka, 1985): the sum of squared proportions of 
different ethnic categories. 
Economic status GDP Per capita 
Income inequality Gini coefficient (Gini, 1997) 
Unemployment Unemployment rates of population (15 years or older) 
Nonprofit organization density Total number of nonprofit organizations divided by the population size 
and then multiplied by 10,000. 
Religion-linked organization 
density 
Total number of religion-linked organization divided by the population 
size and then multiplied by 10,000. 
Law enforcement density Total number of law enforcement personnel divided by the population 
size and then multiplied by 10,000. 
 
 
Table 4-3. Meso-level criminal subculture variables 
Variables Measures 
WCC loss Average losses caused by white collar crime (WWC) 
WCC rate Percent of white collar crime over the total crime taking place 
Percent repeat offenders Percent of all arrestees who are repeat offenders  
Percent WWC guardians Percent of police force devoted to control white collar crime 
Percent dangerous area 
 
Percent city subunits as defined by U.S. Census recognized by police as 
areas populated by criminals, i.e. dangerous places. 
Gang density Total number of gangs divided by the population size and then 





4.5 Calibration  
The main purpose of this section is to show that the proposed agent-based model is able to 
capture the key features of benefit fraud in the wake of disaster and produce reasonable results. 
The procedure used here is empirical validation as defined by Groff (2014), where empirical 
knowledge and data is used to build and calibrate a model. The statistical data of the individuals 
and household disaster relief provided by FEMA for Hurricanes Katrina and Rita is used to 
calibrate the ABM model in a control experiment. 
4.5.1 Individuals and Households Program (IHP) for Hurricane Katrina and Rita 
On August 29 and September 24, 2005, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita caused over 1,800 
deaths and more than 1.2 million people were evacuated or displaced throughout the Gulf Coast 
region (NHC, 2006). The Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) Individuals and 
Households Program (IHP) is one of the main disaster relief programs that provided financial 
assistance to the victims, including rental, repair, replacement, property and expedited assistance. 
The information and data on the benefit fraud of FEMA’s IHP assistance is obtained from the U.S. 
Department of Justice Hurricane Katrina Fraud Task Force (DOJ, 2005, 2006a, 2006b, 2007, 2010, 
2011), the U.S. Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General (DHS-OIG, 2006; 
DHS, 2006; DHS-OIG, 2011), and the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO, 2006b, 
2006a, 2006c, 2006d, 2007, 2014). 
Distribution of Aid  
After the hurricanes, FEMA IHP provided expedited assistance of $2,000. The program 
also offered rental assistance funds (based on area fair market rent) and additional housing 




combination of all forms of IHP financial assistance had a maximum cap of $26,200 (DHS-OIG, 
2006). In 2006, the expedited assistance was adjusted to $500, and the other housing assistances 
were increased to $5,400, $10,900 and $27,200, respectively, to reflect increases in the Consumer 
Price Index (GAO, 2006c).  
According to DHS-OIG (2006), by September 30, 2005, FEMA had received 1,557,937 
registrations for IHP assistance from residents in all affected areas and awarded over $2.4 billion. 
By October 18, 2005, there were 1,645,784 total registrations. Among those, about 19 percent were 
cancelled due to ineligibility or flagged as potential duplicates (DHS-OIG, 2006). By November 
16, 2005, the registrations increased to 1,680,516 of which 984,432 (or 59 percent) were eligible 
and worth approximately $3.5 billion in assistance (DHS-OIG, 2006). By mid-December 2005, 
mid-February 2006, and mid-May 2006, IHP payments totaled about $5.4 billion, $6.3 billion and 
$6.7 billion, respectively (GAO, 2006a, 2006b). By August 2006, among the total 2.4 million 
applications for IHP, only 67% of household assistance and 41% of other needs assistance 
applications were found eligible and had been approved, and approximately 9% of applications 
were pending or appealing the assistance decision. Approximately $7 billion of IHP assistance was 
distributed by October 2006 (GAO, 2006c, 2007).  
The approximate number of total registrations and awarded aid of IHP assistance for 
hurricanes Katrina and Rita are plotted in Figure 4-6 and Figure 4-7. About 65% of the registration 
were received in the first month, assuming that the total number of registrations by Oct 2006 is 
100% (Figure 4-6). Figure 4-7 shows that about 50% of aid was awarded in the first three months, 










Figure 4-7. Awarded assistance for IHP (USD) 
 
 
Improper and potentially fraudulent payments 
Although a considerable proportion of total registrations had been determined as ineligible 
applications and canceled before being paid, many improper and potentially fraudulent payments 
among the awarded applications were recognized, including duplicate registrations, invalid 




payments of the 2.6 million IHP payments made to hurricanes Katrina and Rita registrants by 
February 2006 for further examination (GAO, 2006a). An estimated 16 percent of payments (95 
percent confidence interval of 12 percent to 21 percent of payment or from $600 million to $1.4 
billion) totaling approximately $1 billion were improper and potentially fraudulent due to invalid 
applications (GAO, 2006a). On the other hand, using a different sampling and analysis method, 
DHS reported an estimated improper payment rate of 8.56% for an estimated improper payment 
amount of $450 million by March 1, 2006 (DHS, 2006). FEMA reported that it had overpaid about 
$290 million to nearly 60,000 registrants but it had recollected only about $7 million by November 
2006 through its own internal means (GAO, 2006d). FEMA’s recoupment activities were 
suspended from June 2007 through January 2011 due to a lawsuit and other challenges. As a result, 
even though more than $621.6 million of potentially improper IHP payments have been identified, 
much of this improper disaster assistance disbursed since Hurricane Katrina was uncollected for 
several years. This evidence shows the weakness of the benefit distribution process that exposed 
IHP assistance to fraud, and served to emphasize the importance of preventive controls (DHS-
OIG, 2011).  
4.5.2 Control experiment 
Model environment and parameters  
In the control experiment, the number of householder agents is set to 1.3 million, the 
approximate number of victims of hurricanes Katrina and Rita. The distribution of home damage 
levels and the number of householder agents for each damage level are listed in Table 4-4, which 
is based on the estimated number of damaged houses in Mississippi after hurricanes Katrina and 




agents at the beginning of each simulation according to the distribution in Table 4-4. The definition 
of different damage levels and the corresponding eligible assistance are documented in DHS-OIG 
(2006). It is assumed that the claimed and awarded amounts are equal to the eligible assistance for 
the householder agent, as listed in Table 4-4, but householder agents may submit more than one 
claim in the overall simulation, i.e., duplicate/fraudulent applications. 
 
Table 4-4. Distribution of house damage states and corresponding eligible IHP assistance  
 
 
The other parameters used in the control experiment are listed in Table 4-5, where the 
number of applications reviewed and investigated per day, and the initial probability for 
householders to submit a fraudulent claim are set to normal random variables to capture the 
uncertainty and variations among individuals. To cater to the fact that most of the registrations had 
been made in the first few months, the probability of a householder completing an application in a 
given day, Pc, varies in different post-disaster phases (see Table 4-5). Also, it was often observed 
that very few ineligible and suspicious applications were detected due to the felt need for 
immediate support and the lack of inspection staff during the emergency phase right after the 
disaster. It is assumed that the vulnerability of targets being exposed to fraud will decrease with 
the recruitment of more staff and enhancing fraud-related training. Therefore, the eligible rate of 
applications and the errors of review vary with time to represent the changes in target vulnerability. 
Damage level None Minor Major Destroyed 
Percentage 7.7% 81.0% 9.8% 1.5% 
Number of householder agents in ABM 100,000 1,053,000 127,000 20,000 
Eligible house assistance (USD/ householder) 0 2600 5,200 10,500 
Eligible assistance for other needs (USD/householder) 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 




To simplify the problem, it is assumed that neither type I error nor type II errors of investigation 
occurred in the control experiment. 
Table 4-5. Parameterization of the model for control experiment 
Parameter Value 
Number of householders 1.3 million 
Number of application reviewers  3,000 
Number of special investigators 1,000 
Number of applications reviewed per day by per reviewer, mean (standard 
deviation) 
5 (1) 
Number of applications investigated per day by per investigator, mean (standard 
deviation) 
2.4 (0.5) 
Probability of householder completing an application in a given day, Pc  30% a, 25% b, 8% c 
Initial probability for householders to submit a fraudulent claim, Pi , mean 
(standard deviation) 
1% (0.1%) 
Probability of application being eligible and complete, Pe 95% a, 75% b, 60% c 
Probability of type I error of review (judging a justified claim to be suspicious) 0% a, 2% b, 5% c 
Probability of type II error of review (approving a fraud claim without further 
investigations) 
100% a, 80% b, 60% c 
Probability of type I error of investigation (judging a justified claim as a fraud) 0%  
Probability of type II error of investigation (approving a fraud claim) 0% 
The deadline of submitting applications (number of days after the disaster 
occurred) 
426 days (14 months) 
a Day 1 – Day 14; b Day 15 – Day 45; c After Day 46;  
 
Due to lack of pertinent records, the mean values of CC and CS are assumed to be time-
dependent index functions as plotted in Figure 4-8. The initial negative value of CC in the early 
stages of the disaster reflects the cooperative behavior of the community during the immediate 
post-impact period as predicted by the TCH theory. Eventually, as modeled by the index function, 
the  helpful behavior disappears and returns to neutral. In accord with SDT, the downhill trend of 
CS reflects the dearth of guardians and the negative effect of social disorganization during the post 
emergency phase. It is also a function of the enhanced defenses devoted to control benefit crime 




To consider the variation of community cohesion and criminal subculture impacts on 
individuals, normal random variables with the time-varying mean values in Figure 4-8 and 
standard deviation of 0.25 are employed for the CC and CS indices for each householder agent at 
every time step. The values and trends indicated by Figure 4-8 and discussed above are initial 
estimates that guided by relevant theories of criminology. These estimates can be refined in the 
future as better information becomes available. 
 
 
Figure 4-8. Time varying community cohesion and criminal subculture effects as inspired 




Variable DDt (at time t) is calculated for individual householder agent at each step as shown 
in Equation (3-2).  The equation models the effects of disaster-caused demands and the period of 
time experienced without financial support, where increases in both enhance the effects of the 
disaster demands and vice versa. 
𝐷𝐷 =
𝐷𝐿 × 𝑇  
8
s. t.  0 ≤ 𝐷𝐷 ≤ 1
 (4-2) 


















where DL = 4, 3, 2, and 1 for destroyed, major, minor, and none damage levels of the householder 
agent’s home, respectively; 𝑇   is number of weeks after the disaster that the 
householder agent has not received monetary support. DDt is capped to 1.0. For a householder 
agent with a destroyed home, DDt equals to 1 if their 𝑇   is longer than two weeks.   
Based on SLT theory, the success in previous applications may increase the propensity of 
recommitting benefit fraud. Therefore, the fourth meso-level variable, 𝐸 , is used to represent the 
effect of an agent’s personal experience. 𝐸  is assumed to be 0.2 times the number of approved 
applications 𝑁 , submitted by the agent, with an upper bound of 1.0, as expressed in 
Equation (4-3). The corresponding weights 𝑤 , 𝑤 , 𝑤 , 𝑤  in Equation (3-1) are all equal to 
one. As with CC and CS, these weights are assumed values at present that can eventually be refined 
as more information becomes available in the future. 
𝐸 = 0.2 𝑁  ,        s. t.  0 ≤ 𝐸 ≤ 1 (4-3) 
Monte Carlo simulations are conducted to capture the effects of variability in the main 
parameters. The estimated improper payment rate obtained from a different number of Monte 
Carlo realizations, i.e., n, are compared in Figure 4-9.  It is clear that the results converge when 
the number of realizations is more than 500. Therefore, the mean value and standard deviation of 
one thousand Monte Carlo realizations (n = 1000) are used in the following calibration and 
parametric studies.  
Figure 4-9 shows that the crime response of the community occurs in three distinct phases. 
In Phase I, there is an initial gentle increase in fraud for the first two months. Phase II, which spans 




III, the crime rate ameliorates. These distinct phases fit the observation in Aguirre and Lane (2019)  
that crime level exhibits distinct phases in the aftermath of disasters.   
 
 
Figure 4-9. Estimated improper payment rate obtained from Monte Carlo simulations with 




Adjustment of parameters 
One of main strength of ABM is the ability to model the desired meso-level phenomena by 
properly adjusting individual-level parameters. Figure 4-10 shows how the probability of a 
householder completing an application, Pc, affects the average number of received applications 
during the first 14 months, where the shaded area represents the range between standard deviations, 
i.e., ±𝜎. The actual data from the Hurricane Katrina and Rita case study is represented as circles. 
With Pc constant at 10% and the other parameters kept the same as shown in Table 4-5,  the figure 
shows that the number of applications after the third month matches well with the actual data, but 




4-10). Increasing Pc to 30% (dashed line in Figure 4-10) makes the number of applications rise 
faster in the beginning, but causes significant deviations at later times. Therefore, to represent the 
fact that most of the registrations had been made in the first few months and became much fewer 
later, Pc is made to vary from 30% to 8% with the post-disaster phase as listed in Table 4-5 (solid 
line in Figure 4-10).  
 
 




Using the distribution of Pc in Table 4-5, Figure 4-11 shows the change in the amount of 
assistance granted versus the number of application reviewers. Clearly, the results of the case with 
3000 reviewers match the actual data well, lending some credence to the selected parameters. 
Figure 4-12 shows the improper payments rate over time as a function of Pi, the initial probability 
that a householder will submit a fraudulent claim. The estimated final improper payment rates are 
approximately 8.3%, 13.0%, and 18.3% when Pi equals 0.6%, 1.0% and 1.5% (with 0.1% standard 
deviation) respectively. The numbers compare favorably to the estimates provided in GAO (2006a) 
(12% to 21%) and DHS (2006) (8.56%). It is observed from Figure 4-12 that the improper payment 
























rate had a shaper rise during the third month in the control experiment, which is a direct function 
of the selected parameters and trends. Judging the veracity of this prediction is not feasible because 
the collected statistics are not available at the given time intervals (only the final numbers are 
available). Nevertheless, Figure 4-12 indicates that the parameters and trends can be broadly tuned 
by changing the initial agents’ propensity toward committing frauds, Pi, and the other parameters. 
 
 
Figure 4-11. Distributed assistance in the control experiment 
 
 
Figure 4-12. Improper payment rate 






























4.5.3 Results and discussion 
Results of control experiment 
The parameters of the model used in the control experiment are listed in Table 4-5. Figure 
4-13 shows the proportion of ineligible applications canceled by reviewers before payment as a 
percentage of total reviewed applications over time. According to DHS-OIG (2006), 19% of the 
registrations were cancelled or flagged as potential duplicates by October 18, 2005, and only about 
59% were eligible by November 16, 2005 (41% were found ineligible). By August 2006, only 67% 
of household assistance were discovered eligible, i.e., 33% were ineligible, (GAO, 2006c, p. 18). 
The reported data is not enough for calibration, but it can be tuned as needed or when detailed 
information becomes available by adjusting the probability of applications being eligible and 
complete, Pe, as listed in Table 4-5. 
 
 
Figure 4-13. Ineligible applications canceled by reviewers 
 
 















The FEMA investigation detected about $290 million in overpayments by November 2006, 
about 15 months after the hurricane (GAO, 2006d, p. 4). The simulation shows that the average 
improper payment rate by the 15th months is $312 million, which matches well with the given data, 
as shown in Figure 4-14. It should be noted that, in the actual scenario, it took about 23 months to 
detect all improper payments, but the rate of detection is not known. Figure 4-15 shows the 
















Figure 4-16 examines the relationship between number of months from occurrence of 
disaster to date of fraud being detected and the Log10 of thousand dollars lost to benefit fraud, 
where the crosses represent the result of one realization of Monte Carlo simulation. The ABM 
result is compared to the plot in Aguirre and Lane (2019), which showed the cost of various types 
of white collar crime (WCC) in the aftermath of the Hurricane Katrina and the British Petroleum 
Gulf Coast oil spill versus the number of months to arrest. The difference between the control 
experiment in this study and Aguirre and Lane (2019) is that the control experiment only considers 
the benefit fraud of IHP in Katrina, and the loss is interpolated by the number of months to 
complete the investigation. The dollars lost to benefit fraud is comparatively lower because of the 
amount of financial assistance had a maximum cap. It is needed to build ABMs addressing 







Figure 4-16. Relationship between dollars lost to benefit fraud and month of investigation 
[reprinted from Aguirre and Lane (2019)] 
 
 
Limitations of the calibrated model 
It is commonly accepted that validation of ABMs is challenging due to the complexity and 
uncertainty of modeling human behavior and limitations in obtaining meaningful calibration data. 
Even if more calibration data were available, the resulting calibrated model will still only be valid 
within the range of parameters for which it was calibrated. Moreover, while any specific favorable 
comparison to experimental or observed data strengthens confidence in the model, the high-
dimensional nature of the research problem suggests that the model will not necessarily yield 
correct answers under all conditions. The control experiment conducted above shows that the 
proposed model can reasonably capture the general characteristics of post-disaster benefit fraud in 
a manner that is consistent with well-known theories of criminology. Most importantly, it clearly 
points to areas that need additional data and provides motivation for researchers to collect this type 




Moreover, in this study, the modeled benefit fraud refers to the householders obtaining or 
attempting to obtain financial assistance but having no entitlement to do so, e.g., not having a 
covered loss as a direct result of the disaster, or duplicating the claims for supernumerary benefits. 
It is an important future research to include different behavioral pattern of benefit fraud, e.g., the 
fraud committed by criminals outside of affected areas or syndicated criminal activities, for 
estimating how crime varies in the aftermath of disasters. 
4.6 Parametric Sensitivity Analyses 
The agent-based model described and calibrated in the previous section is used to conduct 
a parametric sensitivity analysis to gain deeper insight into the benefit fraud problem. Two key 
dependent variables are considered here. The first is the percentage of overall improper payments, 
PctFraud, which indicates the proportion of funding that could be used more effectively. The second 
dependent variable is the speed of distributing financial assistance, and the time required for 95% 
of victims with disaster-caused loss to receive the grants, T95%, is adopted. Both dependent 
variables are important and should be evaluated at the same time. The effect of meso/micro impact 
factors and disaster-caused demand on crime propensity are discussed. The other independent 
variables investigated in this section include the number of special investigators, the type II error 
of application review, and the number of applications reviewed per day per reviewer. 
4.6.1 Model environment and parameterization of the base model 
An artificial environment is designed to represent a community of 1 million households 
that is subjected to disasters with varying intensity levels. Three different distributions of house 




6 and Figure 4-17. The replacement cost of a residential building is assumed 253,728 USD, which 
corresponds to the replacement cost of an average class, two story, single family dwelling model 
with a typical size of 1,600 square feet (FEMA, 2003). The repair cost ratios of residential 
buildings, including structural and non-structural components, for five damage states (none, slight, 
moderate, extensive, and complete) are defined as 0%, 2%, 10%, 50% and 100% of building 
replacement cost, respectively (FEMA, 2003). To capture the uncertainty of house damages, the 
repair cost of each damage state is set to a log-normal random variable with μ (mean of logarithmic 
values) equal to the logarithm of repair cost ratio times replacement cost, i.e., log(repair cost ratio 
× replacement cost) and σ (standard deviation of logarithmic values) equal to 0.35. It is assumed 
that the amount of grants claimed by householder agents and approved by reviewer agents equal 
to a quarter of the repair cost, with cap of $34,900 USD, which is the maximum amount for IHP 
declared by FEMA on October 1, 2018 (FEMA, 2018). For criminals with undamaged houses, the 
requested amount is randomly assigned according to the distribution of building damage states in 
the whole community, exclusive of non-damaged houses. Table 4-7 lists the other parameters of 
the base model, and the independent variables to be adjusted in the parametric studies are indicated 
in bold. 
 
Table 4-6. Percentage distribution of house damage state for designed disaster scenarios 
Damage State None Slight Moderate Extensive Complete Total 
Level 1 50% 34% 13% 3% 0% 100% 
Level 2 25% 27% 31% 13% 4% 100% 











The effect of disaster-caused demands is quantified considering the damage state of the 
housing stock and the length of time experienced after the impact without financial support, as 
expressed by Equation (3-2), where DL = 4, 3, 2, and 1 for complete, extensive, moderate, and 
slight damage levels of the householder agent’s home, respectively. The damage state of houses 
are randomly assigned based on the distributions in Table 4-6 at the beginning of each Monte Carlo 
realization. Namely, the damage state of the housing stock is known at the beginning of each 
realization, and the spatial correlation which exists due to the geo-clustering effect or the intensity 
of disasters is ignored in the case studies. The effect of the agent’s personal experience is expressed 
by Equation (4-3). The corresponding weights 𝑤 , 𝑤 , 𝑤 , 𝑤  in Equation (3-1) are all set to 





Table 4-7. Parameterization of the model for sensitivity analysis 
Parameter Value 
Number of householders 1 million 
Number of application reviewers  3000 
Number of special investigators 2000, 3000, 4000 
Number of applications reviewed per day by per reviewer, mean (standard 
deviation) 
2(1), 3 (1), 4(1), 5 (1) 
Number of applications investigated per day by per investigator 1 
Probability of householder completing an application in that day, Pc  30% a, 25% b, 8% c 
Initial probability for householders to submit a fraudulent claim, Pi , mean 
(standard deviation) 
1% (0.1%) 
Probability of application being eligible and complete 95% a, 75% b, 60% c 
Probability of type I error of review (judging a justified claim to be 
suspicious) 
0% a, 2% b, 5% c 
Probability of type II error of review (approving a fraud claim without 
further investigation) 
100% a, 80% b, 60% c  (E1) 
75% a, 60% b, 45% c  (E2) 
50% a, 40% b, 30% c  (E3) 
25% a, 20% b, 15% c  (E4) 
Probability of type I error of investigation (judging a justified claim as a 
fraud) 
0%  
Probability of type II error of investigation (approving a fraud claim) 0% 
The deadline of submitting applications (number of days after the disaster 
occurred) 
426 days (14 months) 
 
4.6.2 Effect of meso/micro impact factors on crime propensity  
The influence of the four meso/micro variables is investigated by adopting five different 
combinations of weights in Equation (3-1):  the base case, WBase, and four other cases (W1 to W4), 
as listed in Table 4-8. Consider the base model subjected to a Level 2 disaster scenario. Figure 
4-18 shows the improper payment rate over time for cases with different weights. By comparing 
the results of case W1 with the ones for case W2 in Equation (3-1), the effect of an agent’s personal 
experience (E) increases with time as more applications are reviewed. Secondly, by comparing the 




criminal subculture (CS) has an opposite effect, matching the THC and SDT theories, respectively, 
used to formulate the model. While influential, varying the weights results in a variation in 
fraudulent applications that is somewhat modest, i.e. between 6.9% and 10.9% (see Figure 4-18).  
 
Table 4-8. Combination of weights used in Equation (4-1) 
Combination 𝑤  𝑤  𝑤  𝑤  
WBase 1 1 1 1 
W1 1 0 0 0 
W2 1 0 0 1 
W3 1 1 0 0 








4.6.3 Effect of disaster-caused demand  
The effects of disaster intensity (see Table 4-6 and Figure 4-17) are shown in Figure 4-19, 
which depicts the progress of payment distribution and the improper payment rate over time as a 















function of disaster demand. It is intuitive that the more severe the disaster, the more loss caused 
and the more financial assistance will be needed. However, what is not obvious is that it takes 
longer to distribute the aid (Figure 4-19 and Figure 4-20) and that the total amount of improper 
payment and the overall improper payment rate become higher (Figure 4-21 and Figure 4-22)as a 
disaster becomes more severe. This is directly attributed to limitations in staffing, which directly 
correlate with a reduction in oversight (guardianship) as well as the desire to expedite the 
distribution of aid.  
Figure 4-21 shows that the timing of the increase in the improper payment is slightly 
different for different levels of disaster. As can be seen in Figure 4-22, the rise of the fraudulent 
rate in the Level 1 case is earlier than the other two. That is because the effect of CS is greater than 
DD in the Level 1 case, and the used CS index (Figure 4-8) is higher in the first few weeks. This 
demonstrates that, with properly calibrated parameters, the proposed model can be used not only 
to assess the overall fraudulent results, but also to investigate the timing of the increase of improper 
payments. 
Figure 4-22 reproduces the three distinct phases observed in Figure 4-9, although the span 
for each phases changes with the level of disaster demand. The model suggests that an increasing 
disaster demand pushes the crime spike later on in time. Those most motivated to seek benefits 
due to their dire situation apply early. Influenced by the strong community cohesion right after the 
disaster, the so-called Gemeinschaft feelings, these applications are mostly legitimate and 
represent Phase I of the process. When the disaster demand is high, Phase I will take longer than 
when the disaster demand is low because the review speed is assumed constant. As the opportunity 
for fraud becomes more broadly recognized and as the Gemeinschaft feelings abate, fraudulent 




in, pushing the fraud sharply upwards (Phase II). The rate then flattens out as the guardianship 
efforts kicks in (Phase III).  
 
 





Figure 4-20. Effect of disaster-caused demand on T95% 
 



















Figure 4-22. Effect of disaster-caused demand on improper payment rate 
 
 
4.6.4 Effect of community cohesion 
In the previous control experiment and parametric studies, the community cohesion effect 
is assumed as the time-dependent function plotted in Figure 4-8 to represent the cooperative 
behavior of the community in the early stages of the disaster. However, how long such 
gemeinschaft feelings last is still a question desired to be answer in social science and disaster 
























studies. To model different levels of community cohesion effect, normal random variables with 
the time-varying mean values in Figure 4-23 and standard deviation of 0.25 are employed as CC 
indices. Figure 4-23(a) shows the CC indices with the same maximum absolute value but changing 
differently along time, where CC1 is the case that the effect of community cohesion last shortest, 
and CC4 the longest. Besides the duration, Figure 4-23(b) consider the impact degree of CC effect, 
where the larger absolute value of CCt indicate the larger negative effect of crime propensity, i.e., 
lower probability to commit crimes. Figure 4-24 (a) and (b) show the changing of improper 
payment rates from Day 1 to Day 450 (15 weeks) corresponding to the CC indices in Figure 4-23 
(a) and (b), respectively, and the other parameters are kept unchanged. It is found that higher 
community cohesion could help to reduce the fraud rate in the long run.  
 
 








Figure 4-24. Improper payment rates under different levels of community cohesion effect 
corresponding to Figure 4-23 (a) and (b), respectively 
 
 
4.6.5 Effect of guardian strength  
The effect of using more government special investigators (2000, 3000, and 4000) is 




distribution of justified payment is plotted in Figure 4-25 for this example. Since the number of 
investigators does not affect the speed of application review, the progress and time required for 
distributing the justified aid is barely affected, as shown in Figure 4-26.  From Figure 4-27, the 
increase in the amount of improper payments can be slowed down if the fraudulent behaviors are 
detected earlier. The final improper payment rate can also be reduced, as shown in Figure 4-28. 
 
 




Figure 4-26. Effect of guardian strength on T95% 




















Figure 4-28. Effect of guardian strength on PctFraud 
 
 
4.6.6 Effect of target vulnerability  
The effect of target vulnerability is evaluated by considering different probabilities of Type 
II review error, i.e., E1, E2, E3, and E4 listed in Table 4-7, where E1 indicates the highest 
probability of review errors and E4 is the lowest. As can be seen in Figure 4-29 and Figure 4-30, 




time required for all justified assistance being paid are close for these four cases. However, the 
improper payment rate is significantly reduced with the decrease of review error, as shown in 
Figure 4-31 and Figure 4-32. Reducing the vulnerability of targets is an effective way to decrease 
the chance of success of fraudulent behaviors, but it might not be easy to achieve. For example, in 
order to decrease the review error, additional specialized training of reviewers must be completed 
and a more comprehensive standard reviewing procedure has to be established. Moreover, this is 
a first order sensitivity analysis, and only one independent variable is adjusted in the experiment. 
The interactions between different parameters are not considered, e.g., a stricter review of an 
application could reduce the errors, but it may take more time to review the same application.  
 
 
Figure 4-29. Effect of target vulnerability on justified payment  






















Figure 4-31. Effect of target vulnerability on improper payment  

















Figure 4-32. Effect of target vulnerability on improper payment rate 
 
 
4.6.7 Effect of review speed 
The effect of review speed (number of applications reviewed by a single reviewer) is 
investigated via the base model subjected to a Level 2 disaster. The number of applications handled 
by a single person is considered to be 2, 3, 4, and 5 with a standard deviation of 1. The other 
parameters are kept the same as the base model shown in Table 4-7. Figure 4-33 shows the 
distribution of justified payment over time, and Figure 4-34 shows the estimated T95% . It is clear 
that the faster the applications are reviewed the more payments could be made in the first few 
months, but the overall improper payment increases slightly with the increase in the review speed, 
as shown in Figure 4-35 and Figure 4-36. This implies that distributing the financial assistance to 
the affected people faster will help the community recover faster, but it must be balanced with the 
anticipated increase in the cost associated with improper payments. Figure 4-35 also suggest that 
a faster review speed contributes to shorter Phase I and more pronounced Phase II. This is because 














the opportunity for fraudulent duplicate applications occurs earlier as fraudsters, encouraged by 
the quick release of funds, submit more duplicate applications.   
 
 




Figure 4-34. Effect of review speed on T95%  
 
 



























A computational tool was proposed to simulate the dynamic process of criminal activities, 
specifically benefit fraud, in the wake of disasters. The formulation, which uses an agent-based 
simulation, considers observed phenomena, relies on established criminological theories and 














addresses disaster demands and social characteristic at both the micro- and meso-levels. Statistical 
data from FEMA’s Individuals and Households Program (IHP) for Hurricanes Katrina and Rita 
was used to calibrate the simulation model and to show that it can capture the basic features of 
benefit fraud while producing sensible results.  
The computational results show that fraudulent activity occurs in three distinct phases. In 
Phase I, where most of the applications come from people who are in a dire situation and the so-
called Gemeinschaft feelings are still strong, the rate of fraudulent applications is small and 
increases gently. As the opportunity for fraud become more broadly recognized and encouraged 
by the release of an initial round of funding, fraudsters become more active, leading to a sharp 
spike in the improper payment rate in Phase II. In Phase III, the guardianship mechanisms kick in 
and the improper payment rate plateaus out. The observed phases match in spirit observations in 
actual disasters. 
The effects of community cohesion, criminal subculture, disaster demands and a criminal’s 
personal experience on crime propensity are examined in light of extensive parametric simulations. 
The results of the analysis show that increasing the accuracy of review, decreasing disaster 
demands, and enhancing guardian strength can help lessen the loss due to post-disaster benefit 
fraud. However, improving the accuracy of review may lead to an increase in review time, i.e. 
there is a trade-off between different objectives, quantified in this research. A higher-order 
sensitivity analysis is needed in future studies to find the optimal balance between the loss of 






This study addresses an existing research gap regarding post-disaster benefit frauds in the 
context of long-term community reconstruction and recovery. The proposed agent-based 
methodology provides the ability to model post-disaster crime in great detail. For example, as 
shown in this study, it is possible to model the spatial and temporal nature of the criminal process 
and its interactions with the unfolding disaster and subsequent recovery efforts. While experience 
with previous disasters and addressing logical gaps in the process can help improve in the aid-
disbursement process, simulations of the sort presented here offer another systematic and powerful 
way to achieve this.  
Due to lack of information about a number of key variables, which were assumed out of 
necessity, the simulation results are not truly predictive. As such, one of the key aspects of this 
study is that it provides insights into the type of information and its level of detail that should be 
sought by researchers and aid officials in future disasters. In the current multi-agent model, benefit 
fraud is only captured in terms of repeatedly submitting application or submitting application when 
the property is not damaged. It is an important future research to include different behavioral 
pattern of benefit fraud, e.g., inflating damaged property, frauds committed by criminals outside 
of the affected areas, identity theft, or syndicated criminal activities, for better understanding the 
mechanisms of benefit fraud in the aftermath of disasters.  
Moreover, the proposed agent-based model can be linked and cooperate with the other 
simulators through the distributed computing platform described in the previous chapters for 
investigating more complex socio-technical interactive behaviors. For example, it can be 
connected to a physical recovery simulator to consider the dynamic effect of recovery efforts on 
householders’ disaster-caused demands. On the other hand, the status of receiving financial aid 




affects the reconstruction plans, the population distribution in the region, and even the local 
economy.  All of these are potential research topics in community resilience and can be studied in 










5 Simple Run-Time Infrastructure (SRTI) for Distributed Simulation of Community Resilience 
Simple Run-Time Infrastructure (SRTI) for Distributed Simulation of 
Community Resilience 
5.1 General 
This chapter introduces a new, scalable, versatile, and user-friendly distributed computing 
software solution, termed Simple Run-Time Infrastructure (SRTI), for simulation of community 
resilience. The motivations, target users and development history of SRTI are provided (Section 
5.2). The initial version of SRTI, codenamed v1.00.00, is described from the high-level 
architecture to its fundamental components (Section 5). Then, an alternative version of SRTI 
(codenamed v2.00.00) that aims to reduce the usage barrier and enable a plug-and-play approach 
to composing simulations is introduced (Section 5.3.2). The case study of wind-excited buildings 
suffering progressive damage in Chapter 2 is repeated using SRTI v1.00.00 to demonstrate the 
capabilities and compare its performance to LCM (Section 5.4). Also, a cross-platform resilience 
analysis of a lifeline system subjected to an earthquake is built using a graphical user interface 
(GUI) and executed through the SRTI v2.00.00 to show its scalability and flexibility (Section 5.5). 
Lastly, the time management and user experience of different versions of SRTI are discussed. The 
limitations and potential features to develop in the future are outlined (Section 5.6).  




A review of the existing distributed simulation standards and tools was provided in Chapter 
2. All existing platforms require extensive user knowledge in order to operate them and therefore 
offer a high barrier to entry for non-specialized users. In this Chapter, a new distributed 
computational solution, termed Simple Run-Time Infrastructure (SRTI), is proposed to address the 
limitations of existing platforms. SRTI permits natural hazards simulations to be modifiable, 
extensible and scalable. It is designed to transfer any type of information between simulators 
thereby maximizing its generality. By not requiring recompilation when new simulators are added 
or data format changes, SRTI is geared to decrease users' effort to get different simulators to 
interact in a meaningful manner so that users can create wide ranging, large-scale simulations 
using a variety of available and user developed simulators of varying fidelities. The data 
communication in the SRTI employs a middleware for data exchange and uses a publish-subscribe 
pattern. The tool is available as a pre-compiled application for quick deployment and integration. 
Treated as a black box accessed through API function calls, a user can edit the open-source code 
or rewrite components to support additional programming languages. Since the SRTI is primarily 
a tool for sharing data, it can also be used for applications outside of simulation, including Internet 
of Things (IoT) devices, remote sensing and smart cities. 
The concept generation and technical development of the SRTI were conducted under the 
auspices of a project funded by the University of Michigan and the US National Science 
Foundation: Interdependencies in Community Resilience (ICoR) (ICoR, 2019) since 2016. The 
initial version of the SRTI, designated v1.00.00, was purely a data-transmission system based on 
the JSON format and did not apply mandatory rules on simulators for time management. While 




information within the transmitted messages. This made the barrier for use of v1.00.00 relatively 
high, as users needed to be familiar with the inner workings of the platform.  
To lower the entry barrier and enable an easy to use, plug-and-play approach for composing 
simulations, a new version of the SRTI that is fundamentally different in its approach is developed. 
The new version is code named, v2.00.00, and designed to have substantially higher functionality 
by supporting time-dependent simulations, for which time synchronization between multiple 
simulators and phase changes are indispensable.  
Unlike the earlier version of SRTI which required users to add code into their simulators 
to allow them to access SRTI, the new version simply requires users to prepare a configuration 
file, which can be edited in any common ASCII text editor, for providing the definition of 
simulators, messages, and their publish/subscribe relationships. An optional application, the SRTI 
graphical user interface (GUI) is provided to reduce a user’s effort and time for constructing such 
configuration files. By using the SRTI GUI, users can describe their simulator system through an 
interactive graphic interface and export the configuration files according to their design. It also 
allows users to launch and execute the RTI Server and simulators through the same interface. 
Moreover, the SRTI GUI helps users inspect the content of messages and system timestep during 
the execution of the simulation. 
SRTI is open-source and free to use. The full source code, pre-compiled libraries, 
documentation, and other information are available at SRTI (2019). The following sections 
describe in detail the high-level architecture of different version of the SRTI, their essential 
components, and data structure. Implementation examples are provided. In addition to the user 
experiences, a summary of limitations and potential features to develop in the future are discussed 




5.3 Introduction of SRTI 
5.3.1 SRTI v1.00.00 
As shown in Figure 2-2, the initial version of SRTI consists of three components: 1) RTI 
Server (middleware), 2) RTI Lib API, and 3) clients (simulators provided by the user).  
 
 
Figure 5-1. High-level structure of the SRTI v1.00.00  
 
The RTI Server is a server-side application that manages the deployment of messages 
throughout the SRTI system. All simulators in the SRTI system must connect to the RTI Server 
for sending or receiving messages. These connections use the transmission control protocol (TCP) 




and compatible with different operating systems, and it can be run either on the same machine or 
a separate machine from simulators in a system. Once launched, the RTI Server opens a server 
socket and displays its “hostname” and “port number” for the user to identify it. Then, a simulator 
can connect to the RTI Server based on the associated hostname and port number.  
The RTI Server GUI is an optional graphical user interface that displays the information of 
the RTI Server, such as hostname, port number and a list of connected simulators. The RTI Server 
GUI acts as a simple simulator that automatically connects to the RTI Server, and subscribes to 
every message, but publishes nothing. Therefore, users can inspect a live feed of connected 
simulations and the data messages presently received by the RTI Server. Figure 3-2 is an example 
of the RTI Server GUI. 
After connecting to the Server, a simulator must notify the RTI Server regarding what 
messages (by name) it wants to subscribe to for performing the “publish-subscribe” message 
distribution. A proprietary SRTI message is sent through the RTI Lib API to the RTI Server to 
manage the subscription. The RTI Lib API is a pre-compiled library of functions used to assist and 
manage the interactions between the RTI Server and simulators. A Java and C++ version of the 
RTI Lib API have been prepared to be used instantly with simulators written in a compatible 
language.  
The RTI Lib API currently provides over fifty functions to assist in connecting to the 
server, publishing/subscribing messages, and parsing data. A simulator may need lines of code to 
be added to call upon specific functions available in the RTI Lib API, which may affect its design. 
A complete list of the available APIs and detailed sequence diagrams describing the order of events 





Once told about the subscription, the messages received by the RTI Server for a given name 
will be sent to the simulator through its RTI Lib API instance. When a simulator publishes a 
message, it sends the message through the socket to the RTI Server. The RTI Server immediately 
checks the name of the message and forwards the message to all simulators subscribing to that 
message. In the SRTI v1.00.00, the RTI Server does not have control of who joins the simulation 
system or when they execute. By letting the RTI Server take charge of message deployment, each 
simulator can be independent in order to attain a plug-and-play system design.  
 
 
Figure 5-2. Example of the RTI Server GUI 
 
5.3.2 SRTI v2.00.00 
As discussed above, the SRTI v1.00.00 is a flexible and simple solution to pass data 




transmitted messages and use RTI Lib API functions for composing simulations. To lower the 
entry barrier and reduce the user programming efforts, an alternative version of the SRTI that is 
built upon v1.00.00’s foundation was developed. The new version, code named, v2.00.00, was 
designed with the purpose of managing simulator actions and time synchronization between 
multiple simulators inside a larger complex system, while maintaining user accessibility to easily 
replace or edit components of the system.  
A high-level view of the architecture of the SRTI v2.00.00 is shown in Figure 4-7. To 
facilitate referral to the software, the version (v2.00.00) will be dropped in subsequent discussions. 
In addition to the RTI Server and RTI Lib API, the pre-compiled components added in the SRTI 
include the RTI Management Server, RTI Wrapper, and GUI (optional).  
 
 





SRTI v2.00.00 employs the same socket connection and publish-subscribe data 
transmission pattern as v1.00.00. The difference is that the RTI Management Server and the RTI 
Wrapper will manage the system and convey data in the expected order based on specific key-
value pairs embedded in each message. These internal key-value pairs, including “timestamp” (the 
computer system’s time when the message was sent), “vTimestamp” (the virtual timestep for the 
simulation system), and “source” (the name of the simulator it came from), are clearly defined in 
the SRTI Developer Documentation (SRTI, 2019). 
The RTI Management Server keeps track of an internal virtual timestep that is shared in 
each message. Once the RTI Management Server receives a “finish” confirmation from every 
active simulator, the virtual timestep is increased by one, and the Server sends a message to request 
to each RTI Wrapper to “start” the next step. This process repeats, preventing any single simulator 
from proceeding to the next step too early, while allowing for some computational parallelization 
where the user deems it safe. 
The RTI Wrapper handles both the connection to the RTI Management Server, and to the 
user’s simulator code itself. It reads and writes variable data from the simulator during execution 
and shares it with the larger simulation system. At the beginning of the RTI Wrapper’s execution, 
it will read a configuration file, which defines the relevant variables and functions inside the user’s 
simulator, as input. The configuration file is saved in JSON format, and consists of a large set of 
parameters that can be defined by the user. A complete list of these parameters including value 
type and definition can be found in the documentation on the SRTI GitHub site (SRTI, 2019).   
The configuration file can be edited by hand in a text editor, or through the SRTI GUI. The 
SRTI GUI is a more advanced version of the interface with two primary functions: to help define 




a single place (within the GUI itself). An overview and important details of the SRTI GUI are 
shown in Figure 5-4. Users may need to study the documentation of the SRTI (SRTI, 2019) 












5.3.3 Data structure  
One important objective of the SRTI is providing the freedom and flexibility of message 
definition in simulations. To reduce data size and speed up the transmission, some other distributed 
simulation solutions encode a message as byte code, but this requires defining the data format in 
advance and compiling it as a specific data package of the data-transfer software to handle it. For 
the SRTI, there are fewer limitations. From the user’s perspective, a simulator generally only needs 
to provide a “message name” and “message content,” each represented in String format (ASCII 
text). When sent over the network to the RTI Server, the entire message (including name and 
content) is converted as a single String through the RTI Lib API. Because the message is encoded 
as a String, no recompiling of the SRTI is required to drive a simulation system. SRTI’s 
implementation may be expected to be slower in comparison with the ones using byte values, but 
its versatility without relying on complex compiling instructions is a significant advantage. 
Each message, hidden from the user, is sent as a JSON object within the SRTI system. The 
SRTI adds the following elements to the top level of the JSON object: “name” (the name of the 
message), “content” (data the simulators share and receive), as well as system “timestamp”, 
“vTimestamp”, and “source”, which have been described before. Aside from “name” and 
“content,” any other values are proprietary to the internal function of the SRTI and are typically 
not the responsibility of the user, but these elements can be accessed by the user’s simulator if 
deemed necessary.  
Although the RTI Lib API provides many useful functions for converting data format, the 
responsibility to parse and generate “content” is entirely given to the simulators, providing the 
most freedom possible, as well as improved ease-of-use regarding message transfer. It is suggested 




must be known by simulators in order to parse and utilize the data and must be convertible to 
“String” format. With these two rules met, the “content” can be in any format a simulator can 
output. Such design of data structure is a major factor allowing the use of the SRTI without 
recompiling when new data formats are required.  
5.4 Implementation of SRTI v1.00.00: Application to Wind Engineering 
More implementation details and user experiences for different versions of the SRTI are 
demonstrated in the following sections. First, the case study of wind-excited buildings suffering 
progressive damage in Chapter 2 is repeated using the SRTI v1.00.00 to demonstrate the 
capabilities and compare its performance to LCM. Then, a cross-platform resilience analysis of a 
lifeline system subjected to an earthquake is modified from the framework in Chapter 3 and 
executed through the SRTI v2.00.00 using the GUI to show its scalability and flexibility. 
5.4.1 Problem description 
The same case study of wind-excited buildings suffering progressive damage in Chapter 2 
is conducted using the SRTI v1.00.00 to demonstrate its capabilities and computational 
performance. In this example, each simulator representing one part of the wind disaster event is 
written in MATLAB and run on a separate processor. The difference between both simulations is 
the method of connecting the simulators. In Chapter 2, the data transmission was done through 
LCM, whereas the SRTI v1.00.00 is used to conduct the same simulation herein. Comparing to 
the data flow of the illustrative example in Chapter 2 (Figure 2-2), Figure 4-5 shows the SRTI 
architecture of the case study. The detail descriptions of simulators can be found in Chapter 2. The 




content of a StoryDisplacement message, D(t), is shown in Table 5-1. There are two variables, step 
and step_time, included in every message to indicate the current step and simulation time of the 
message. Example Matlab code of the Structural Analysis Simulator is shown in Figure 5-6 to 
illustrate the use of the RTI Lib API functions. 
To compare the results between the SRTI and LCM implementations, an identical wind 
speed history with a 3,927 sec duration and a sampling frequency of 1.27 Hz is then applied to a 
group of prototype buildings. The affected buildings all have the same rectangular building plan 
but different heights and orientations, as shown in Figure 2-6. Special moment resisting steel 
frames are used for the lateral resistance, and the location and the member sizes of the frames can 












Table 5-1. Example content of StoryDisplacement message 
StoryDisplacement: D(t) 
Variable Data Type(*) Description 
step int Index for the current step 
step_time double Simulation time of the current step 
nbuildings int Total number of buildings 
max_story int Number of stories of the tallest building 
story_disps double (max_story, nbuildings) A matrix containing story displacements of all 
buildings  
*: where (m, n) describes the dimensions of a matrix if needed 
 




%======== Connect to the SRTI Server ===================================== 
rtiLib = RTILib(); 
hostname = "192.168.60.1"; 








%======== Receive Subscribed Messages ==================================== 
msg_scenario = rtiLib.getNextMessage("Scenario"); 
m_sce = rtiLib.getMessageContent(msg_scenario); 
msg_windload = rtiLib.getNextMessage("WindLoad"); 
m_wl = rtiLib.getMessageContent(msg_windload); 
  
%======= decode messages from Json format ================================ 
nbuildings = int32(str2double(rtiLib.getJsonObject("nbuildings",m_sce))); 
buildinginfo = str2num(rtiLib.getJsonObject("buildinginfo",m_sce)); 
step = int32(str2double(rtiLib.getJsonObject("gstep",m_wl))); 
windloads = str2num(rtiLib.getJsonObject("gloads",m_wl)); 
  
  
%======= Calculate displacement ========================================== 
displacements = StruAnaModel(nbuildings,buildinginfo,step,windloads); 
  
%======= Encode messages to Json format ================================== 
msg = rtiLib.setJsonObject("", "step", rtiLib.getJsonObject("step",m_wl)); 
msg = rtiLib.setJsonObject(msg, "step_time", rtiLib.getJsonObject("step_time",m_wl)); 
msg = rtiLib.setJsonObject(msg, "nbuildings", 
rtiLib.getJsonObject("nbuildings",m_sce)); 
msg = rtiLib.setJsonObject(msg, "story_disps", mat2str(displacements)); 
  
%======= Publish messages ================================================ 
rtiLib.publish("StoryDisplacement",msg); 
  
%======= Disconnect to the SRTI Server =================================== 
rtiLib.disconnect();  
 




5.4.2 Results and discussion  
As shown in Figure 4-6, which plots the roof displacement of B1, conducting the 
simulations using the SRTI and with the LCM (Chapter 2) yielded numerically equivalent results 
thus validating the SRTI implementation. A key advantage of the SRTI is in user effort, which is 
significantly less than the LCM effort documented in Chapter 2. The SRTI users in the above 
example downloaded the pre-complied SRTI applications and wrote a few additional lines of code 
to call the RTI Lib API functions, as shown in Figure 5-6, in order to connect the server and 
publish/subscribe the desired messages. The RTI Lib API automatically converted the messages 
into String and JSON objects and the simulation was then ready to proceed.  
 
 






In contrast, users of the LCM version had to download the most current version of the LCM 
and then compiled it on their local machine. Users then needed to create a type definition file (.lcm) 
for each message following the LCM data structure syntax, and then run the build the LCM tool, 
i.e., lcm-gen, to marshal well-defined data into language-specific bindings. These bindings had to 
be re-generated if the original message definitions (.lcm) had any changes, e.g., the type of a 
variable was changed from integer to double, the size of a matrix was changed, or additional 
variables were added. Also, similar to the SRTI, the users had to write several lines of code for 
publishing and subscribing the messages to the corresponding the LCM channels.  
The above discussion indicates that there are two main differences between the SRTI and 
the LCM regarding user efforts. The first is that the former is pre-complied and ready-for-use after 
being downloaded while the latter requires local compilation. The second and more important 
difference is the flexibility of message definition in the SRTI simulations. The entire message 
within the SRTI system is converted into a single String. Unlike the LCM, the user of the SRTI 
does not need to re-generate language-specific message bindings every time the definition of a 
message changes. As long as the “name” and “content” of the message are converted to a String, 
the value and the data type of the variables within the messages are independent of the SRTI 
system. This characteristic gives the users great freedom for message definition and the flexibility 
to easily add new variables or change their format. In addition, as is clear from Figure 4-5, SRTI 
has better extensibility to allow additional simulators to join the simulation and therefore increase 
its complexity. 
The total simulation and computation time for each simulator are compared in Table 5-2 
and Table 5-3, for the SRTI and the LCM trials, respectively. The data in the tables are the average 




an Intel Xeon CRU-E3-1240 v5, 3.50 GHz, 32 GB, 64-bit machine. The computation time of a 
simulator indicates the time spent in the main calculation function which computes output results 
based on the input values extracted from the subscribed messages. It does not include time for data 
transmission, connecting to the server, processing data format, and subscribing to and publishing 
messages. It is also important to note that the case study is a sequential one, where each simulator 
does not proceed until it receives the messages to which it subscribes. Since both the SRTI and the 
LCM cases use the same computation functions for all simulators, the total simulation time minus 
the sum of the computation time for all simulators is the extra time spent on distributed 
communication, including connecting to the server (for the SRTI), parsing data formats, setting up 
publish-subscribe relationships, and passing messages. 
Table 5-2 and Table 5-3 show that the computation times are consistent among the five 
trials. On average, the whole simulation took 1.2 times longer to execute with SRTI than with the 
LCM. The communication time was 1.5 times longer in the SRTI compared to the LCM. This 
outcome can be attributed to three main reasons, all of which the authors are working to address 
in future versions of the SRTI without sacrificing the advances in terms of interface available to 
developers. The first reason is a difference in the networking architecture, i.e., simulator-to-
simulator in the LCM versus simulator-to-middleware in the SRTI. Thus, messages in the SRTI 
are transmitted twice more than the ones in the LCM case, first from publisher to the server, then 
from the server to the subscribers. The second reason pertains to the differing transfer speeds of 
different data types. SRTI currently uses “string” format to allow messages to be sent without 
compilation, thus requiring more bytes for the same amount of information that is marshaled in 




with parsing messages. In the SRTI, messages have to be encoded/decoded to/from a JSON object 
through the RTI Lib API.  
Although the slower speed is a disadvantage of the current version of SRTI compared to 
LCM, it is believed that facilitating the ease of use by users who are potentially not well versed in 
programming or computation is a higher priority goal. Improving the interfaces to developers can 
be much harder in future versions than improving performance, since interfaces tend to be hard to 
change once they develop a user base. Another crucial advantage of the SRTI is that its architecture 
preserves the ability to manage complex, large-scale simulations. While increasing the freedom of 
the message format definition, SRTI uses RTI Server as a middleware to manage message 
communication, thus retaining the ability to control the overall simulation and has the potential to 
foster the development of new features in the future as discussed in the later section. 
 
Table 5-2. Performance time of the SRTI (v1.00.00) trials 
SRTI Computation time of each simulation Total 
Simulation 
Time 
Time Spent on 
Distributed 










1 0.117 73.017 1.557 0.622 1917.007 1545.904 6806.148 3267.924 
2 0.042 74.386 1.526 0.625 1963.711 1597.581 6973.225 3335.354 
3 0.010 72.207 1.534 0.649 1845.327 1434.615 6520.056 3165.714 
4 0.087 70.745 1.509 0.632 1829.499 1431.861 6425.632 3091.299 
5 0.070 80.054 1.738 0.705 2084.790 1654.067 7301.648 3480.224 
Avg. 0.065 74.082 1.573 0.647 1928.067 1532.806 6805.342 3268.103 
(Unit: seconds) 
 
Table 5-3. Performance time of the LCM trials 
LCM Computation time of each simulation Total 
Simulation 
Time 
Time Spent on 
Distributed 










1 0.007 77.222 1.512 0.617 1981.982 1592.495 5882.098 2228.263 
2 0.008 75.038 1.612 0.637 1862.710 1459.244 5465.294 2066.045 
3 0.005 76.174 1.516 0.621 1862.548 1433.553 5437.788 2063.371 
4 0.006 75.761 1.572 0.653 1891.179 1463.391 5536.242 2103.680 
5 0.005 75.533 1.465 0.627 1885.574 1461.992 5516.550 2091.354 





5.5 Implementation of SRTI v2.00.00: Cross-Language Simulation  
5.5.1 Problem description 
In this section, a cross-platform simulation of an electric power system subjected to an 
earthquake is conducted through the SRTI Server and Wrapper (release “v2.22.02”) and v2.00.00 
Manager GUI (release “v0.80.03”). To demonstrate the scalability and flexibility of the SRTI, the 
time-dependent analysis of interdependent lifeline systems in Chapter 3 has been simplified to 
consider the electric power system only, as illustrated in Figure 5-8. In addition, a Visualization 
Simulator written in NetLogo has been added to show the ability of the SRTI to connect simulators 
across multiple languages. Figure 5-9 shows the simulation framework of the cross-language 
example. Except for the Visualization Simulator, which is implemented using NetLogo, the other 



















Using the SRTI and GUI to conduct the simulation, the disaster event and post-disaster 
recovery effort are represented by seven simulators that may run at one or both of the disaster and 
recovery phases, named Stage 0 and Stage 1, as shown in Figure 5-10 and Figure 5-11. The time 
step of the disaster phase and recovery process is taken as 0.01 second and one day, respectively. 
In Stage 0, (i.e. disaster phase), the Scenario Simulator provides the coordinates and 
connectivity of the electric power system. The Hazard Simulator estimates ground motion 
magnitudes at the location of components, where the EQ2 case in Chapter 3 is adopted for 
considering an earthquake with a 5% probability of exceedance in 50 years. The Damage 
Simulator obtains the physical damage of components using fragility functions from HAZUS-MH 
(FEMA, 2003). The Performance Simulator assesses the connectivity loss of the electric power 
system. The Recovery Simulator and Visualization Simulator subscribe the messages from 
Damage Simulator and Performance Simulator to update the damage state of components and the 
system performance, but they neither carry out calculations nor publish messages in this stage.   
In Stage 1, (i.e. recovery phase), the Strategy Simulator distributes limited recovery 
resources (15 units/day) to the damaged components in order of their priority, namely, the P 
strategy in Chapter 3. The Recovery Simulator estimates the physical reconstruction progress of 
the damage components based on whether they are allocated recovery resources at the current time 
step. The Performance Simulator keeps updating the system performance of lifelines based on the 
recovery progress and the Visualization Simulator subscribes to the messages from the Recovery 
Simulator and Performance Simulator to update the reconstruction progress and system 
performance. 
The active simulators and messages in each stage are listed in Table 5-4 and Table 5-5. The 




timestep and stage) inside the “RTI Wrapper,” which has been adapted to use the same subscription 
pattern as normal messages for simplification. Simulators can decide whether to subscribe the 
“RTI_” message depending on their needs, e.g., dependency with timestep or stage. The detailed 
topological configuration of the lifeline system and the methodology of each simulator have been 
well documented in Chapter 3. This section focuses primarily on the description of the procedure 
using the SRTI v2.00.00 and GUI. 
 
Table 5-4. Active simulators and messages in Stage 0 
Simulator Published Message Subscribed Message 
Scenario Scenario RTI_ 
Hazard GroundMotion Scenario, RTI_ 
Damage Damage Scenario, GroundMotion, RTI_ 
Performance Performance Scenario, Damage, RTI_ 
Recovery - Scenario, Damage, RTI_ 
Visualization - Scenario, Damage, Performance, RTI_ 
 
 
Table 5-5. Active simulators and messages in Stage 1 
Simulator Published Message Subscribed Message 
Performance Performance Recovery, RTI_ 
Strategy Strategy Performance, RTI_ 
Recovery Recovery Strategy, RTI_ 


















5.5.2 The procedure using the RTI Wrapper and GUI  
As described in the documentation of the SRTI (SRTI, 2019), the pre-compiled SRTI files 
can be downloaded from the public GitHub Site. The download should include the SRTI Server, 
RTI Wrapper, and SRTI GUI, all of which can execute without explicitly installing 
(uncompressing files and setting system paths, etc.). In addition to saving the SRTI Server and 
GUI in a file directory on the local machine, user needs to prepare individual folders for each 













After preparing the file system, the next step is to launch the SRTI GUI.exe, for which 
layout is shown in Figure 5-4. Simulators/messages can be created and defined through the GUI. 
Then, users can click the objects on the Object List to add well-defined simulators or messages to 
the Canvas for a given stage. They could use action toggle buttons to define the publish/subscribe 
relationships between them, as shown in Figure 5-10 and Figure 5-11. All the defined simulators, 
messages, and publish/subscribe relationships can then be saved as a .project file to be imported 
and edited in the future. User would find the other files with extensions as described in Table 5-6 
after saving a project. These files are coded in ASCII-text data format, typically representing a 




simulator or message (i.e. .simdef and .mesdef) can be imported into a new project independently 
to prevent re-defining from scratch. 
 
Table 5-6. Description for different file extension 
File Extension Description 
.project Represents a single large JSON object that defines the full project. 1 of these files 
exists per project. 
.simdef Optional output file that describes a single simulator referenced in the .project file.  
.mesdef Optional output file that describes a single message referenced in the .project file.  
 
User needs to click “Export Execute Files” from Menu Bar first to generate the 
configuration files for a Wrapper to read. The example Matlab code of the Scenario Simulator 
(“Scenario.m”) written by the user and the auto-generated configuration files (“Settings.json” and 
“Scenario_config.json”) exported from the GUI are shown in Figure 5-12 to Figure 5-14.  
 
classdef Scenario < handle 
    properties 
        stage 
        timestamp 
        node 
        connectivity 
    end 
     
    methods 
        function obj = Scenario() 
        end 
         
        function Initialize(obj) 
            [obj.node,obj.connectivity] = ScenarioSim(obj.stage); 
        end 
         
        function Simulate(obj) 
        end 
         
        [node,connectivity] = ScenarioSim(stage); 
    end 
end 
 




    "global": "Global.json",  
    "configuration": "Scenario_config.json" 
} 





    "hostName": "localhost", 
    "portNumber": "42012", 
    "simulatorName": "Scenario", 
    "simulatorRef": "Scenario", 
    "stageChannels": [ 
        { 
            "stage": 0, 
            "order": 0, 
            "timestepDelta": 1, 
            "timestepMul": 1, 
            "timestepVarDelta": "" 
        } 
    ], 
    "initializeChannels": [ 
        { 
            "functionName": "Initialize", 
            "stage": 0 
        } 
    ], 
    "simulateChannels": [ 
        { 
            "functionName": "Simulate", 
            "timestepDelta": 1, 
            "stage": 0 
        } 
    ], 
    "subscribedChannels": [ 
        { 
            "messageName": "RTI_", 
            "oneTime": false, 
            "mandatory": true, 
            "relativeOrder": 0, 
            "maxTimestep": 0, 
            "timestepDelta": 1, 
            "stage": 0, 
            "varChannel": [ 
                { 
                    "valueName": "stage", 
                    "varName": "stage" 
                }, 
                { 
                    "valueName": "stageVTimestep", 
                    "varName": "timestamp" 
                } 
            ] 
        } 
    ], 
    "publishedChannels": [ 
        { 
            "messageName": "Scenario", 
            "initial": true, 
            "timestepDelta": 1, 
            "stage": 0, 
            "varChannel": [ 
                { 
                    "valueName": "node", 
                    "varName": "node" 
                }, 
                { 
                    "valueName": "connectivity", 
                    "varName": "connectivity" 
                } 
            ] 
        } 
    ], 
    "endConditions": [], 
    "stageConditions": [] 
} 





The user can either run the simulation system within the SRTI GUI, or separately using a 
command line prompt to open each simulator one by one. To run the simulation directly within 
the GUI, user can click on the “Power On” button (in the Execute Buttons section) to launch an 
instance of the RTI Server and the individual simulators. After allowing a few seconds for 
everything to finish opening and ensure all simulators are connected to the Server successfully, 
the user can then inspect the “List of connected apps” panel in the RTI Server graphic interface 
(Figure 3-2). At that point, the other buttons in the Execute Buttons section are possible to click. 
“Play” will start/resume the simulation system, “Pause” will pause the simulation system, and 
“Stop” will close the RTI Server and the simulators.  
Other features of the SRTI GUI include being able to display the content of messages and 
system timestep in the inspector panel to better trace the system’s execution outside the individual 
simulators. In addition, while the simulation is running, the color of the simulator objects on the 
Canvas will change according to their status, as shown in Figure 5-15. Blue ones indicate the 
simulators waiting for the messages that they subscribed to, and red ones are the simulators running 
their internal calculation. Figure 5-16 shows the progress of seismic damage and post-disaster 
recovery of the power system plotted by NetLogo Visualization Simulator, where blue, green, 
yellow, orange, and red color indicate the non-, minor, moderate, extensive, and complete damage 
state of lifeline components. Figure 5-17 shows the time history of system performance plotted by 






Figure 5-15. Screenshot of SRTI GUI and NetLogo Visualization Simulator while the 



















5.6 Discussion  
5.6.1 Time management and user experience 
In SRTI v1.00.00, the RTI server does not apply any mandatory rules on simulators for 
time management. If simulation time is a key concern, users need to embed this kind of information 
within transmitted messages, and create their own rules regarding time. However, the SRTI 
v2.00.00 permits some time management features to be controlled at the RTI Management Server-
level. For example, the controlling of time step and simulation stage can be automated through the 
RTI Management Server by many controlling parameters, either defined inside a configuration file 
by users before the start of a system execution, or inside subsequent messages during execution. 
A complete list of these controlling parameters are provided in the documentation on the SRTI 
GitHub site (SRTI, 2019).   
To conduct a simulation using the SRTI v1.00.00, the user must first start the RTI Server 
so that simulators can connect to it. Then, to connect simulators to the RTI Server through the RTI 
Lib API, the user must assign the corresponding host name and port number. They can either type 
these values manually into the simulator’s source code or let a pre-compiled simulator read these 
from an external source, such as launch parameters or from an external data file. In order to run an 
entire simulation system, each simulator must be launched individually by the user. After running 
the simulator, the RTI Server should react to confirm it has connected successfully, and the users 
can check the list of connected simulators on the RTI Server GUI (see Figure 3-2). Since the RTI 
Server has no control of when simulators execute, users are responsible for ensuring the logic of 
the calculations within the simulators. They will need to design their simulators to either wait for 




On the other hand, the RTI Wrapper and the GUI in the SRTI v2.00.00 greatly improve the 
workflow. Rather than writing additional lines of code in the simulator to call upon specific RTI 
Lib API functions, users can execute a RTI Wrapper to handle the connection to the RTI 
Management Server and data parsing, as long as a configuration file is provided in the 
corresponding file directories. A simulation system’s configuration files can be edited by hand, 
and individual RTI Wrapper instances (for each simulator) can be started manually. Alternatively, 
the GUI can assist users defining the configuration file for each RTI Wrapper, and allow execution 
of the whole simulation system from a single place. Project files for the GUI, and individual 
simulators and messages in the project can be saved and reloaded for the later use. In addition, the 
GUI provides system feedback when the simulation is running, such as portraying which simulator 
is currently in the process of finishing a step, the content of recent messages, and current system 
timestep.  
Overall, the SRTI v2.00.00 provides useful time management features and improves the 
workflow, but the downside is the difficulty of creating a generalized management system. 
Although the SRTI v2.00.00 can handle most design preferences, it does not allow unlimited 
control like earlier versions of the SRTI (v1.00.00) can. Users can choose either version depended 
on the desired usability. 
5.6.2 Limitations and future opportunities 
The SRTI’s different versions have each been designed with usability as its primary goal, 
ignoring the common goal of execution speed. Some common strategies to increase computation 
performance may require local compilation to optimize data formats, or require that simulators run 




defined in the same language. While, these may conflict with the SRTI’s goal of being scalable 
and flexible. Ultimately, it is unlikely that the SRTI will be able to match the performance of 
similar tools without losing the original goals. Therefore, systems that require frequent transfer of 
large packets of data should not use the SRTI, unless they are capable of absorbing the extra 
execution time from this new bottleneck.  
On the other hand, the data content from each simulator is not absolute, and cannot 
represent everything that an additional (future, as-of-yet unknown) simulator might require. For 
certain research groups, creating a standard, strictly defined format might be necessary to help 
designers who want to extend a system with new simulators. This is against the open concept of 
the SRTI, but such rules can be defined and enforced while using the SRTI as middleware. Finding 
a balance between these lines of thought will invoke further discussion across different fields. 
Despite a potential trade-off of computational efficiency, providing ease of use to users 
who may not be knowledgeable in programming is a significant advantage of SRTI. At the same 
time, SRTI’s architecture preserves the ability to manage complex, large-scale simulations. While 
having high flexibility in the message format definition, SRTI uses the RTI Server as a middleware 
to manage message communication, thus retaining the ability to control the overall simulation and 
has the potential to foster the development of new features, such as sophisticated time management 
or specific quality of service (QoS) policies for complex simulations. 
The RTI Wrapper plays an important role to communicate these time management features 
to the RTI Management Server in the SRTI v2.00.00. As discussed in Xu et al. (2020), in most 
existing distributed simulation platforms and data passing tools, the user must modify the internal 
code of their simulator to connect to a larger system using specific instructions. While this feature 




the RTI Wrapper. The RTI Wrapper is pre-compiled and distributed online for users to simply 
download and run locally. However, a RTI Wrapper compatible with the simulator must be used. 
At the time of this writing, RTI Wrapper versions for Java, Matlab and NetLogo (Wilensky, 1999) 
have been prepared for public access. It may be re-written in a new language for the other computer 
language in need of support.   
The time management and synchronization of virtual simulations is commonly associated 
with artificial time, but there is no reason a ‘real-time’ simulator (utilizing sensors in real space) 
could not be linked to the system. This type of simulation would require the assumption that certain 
messages are not necessary to be sent once every time step, an option that the SRTI fully supports. 
Therefore, investigating a hybrid system that consists of both virtual and real simulators can be a 
future research opportunity for the SRTI.   
5.7 Conclusions 
A new distributed computing software solution, Simple Run-Time Infrastructure (SRTI), 
is described. SRTI is able to integrate discipline-specific models in natural hazards simulation. 
SRTI is based on a client-server structure and uses a publish-subscribe pattern to achieve data 
communication between simulators executed on separate processes or machines. It is a scalable 
and versatile solution that does not require recompilation when new simulators are added or data 
format changes, thereby significantly facilitating its deployment by non-specialized users. As such, 
SRTI provides a unique service for researchers in the natural hazards field who seek to integrate a 
variety of simulators into overarching simulations of disaster scenarios to study how these events 




The high-level structure of the initial version of the SRTI (v1.00.00) and its key 
components are introduced in detail firstly. Next, an improved version of the SRTI (v2.00.00), 
which better supports time-dependent simulations and provides a low barrier to entry to user with 
limited programming experience, is described. The data structure of the SRTI is also introduced. 
The full source code, pre-compiled libraries, documentation, and other information are available 
at SRTI (2019). 
Two implementation examples for different version of the SRTI are provided. A case study 
of wind-excited buildings suffering progressive damage described in Chapter 2 is presented to 
demonstrate the capabilities of the SRTI v1.00.00. The user experience and performance are 
discussed and compared with the LCM. The result of trials represents the performance of the SRTI 
where computational efficiency is sacrificed to some extent in the quest to allow users to compose 
their distributed simulations more easily and quickly. Besides, the scalability and usability of the 
SRTI v2.00.00 are demonstrated through a cross-language simulation of seismic damage and post-
disaster recovery of a lifeline system, exploiting the SRTI GUI. It shows that the RTI Wrapper and 
GUI greatly improve the workflow. 
Finally, the time management and user experience of different versions of SRTI are 
discussed. Some other enhancements of the SRTI that feasible in the future are outlined, including 
improvement of performance and better compatibility with other programming languages. As a 
free and open source software, the implementation of SRTI’s design will continue to be improved 









6 Summary, Conclusions, and Future Research 
Summary, Conclusions, and Future Research 
6.1 Summary 
The interdependencies that arise between the infrastructure systems of society can 
profoundly influence community resilience. Studying the interactions that occur between 
infrastructure systems is challenging because of the high disciplinary boundaries between fields in 
which each system is rooted and due to the disparate temporal and spatial scales of these systems. 
To address these technical challenges, simulation frameworks for modeling and investigating the 
interactions between infrastructure systems during extreme natural disasters and the post-disaster 
recovery process were developed. In particular, this dissertation explored the time-dependent 
effect of interdependencies on community resilience.  
Existing distributed simulation standards and tools were systematically reviewed first. 
Based on the survey, the LCM distributed simulation framework, which connects discipline 
specific simulators via a publish-subscribe data transmission pattern, was selected for modeling 
interdependencies. Each simulator in the system was seen as a black box subscribing to data from 
other simulators and/or publishing its results for others to use. An analysis of a collection of 
multistory buildings that suffered progressive damage during a wind event was presented to 
demonstrate the capabilities of the selected framework.  
A time-dependent resilience assessment of three interdependent lifeline systems subjected 




pattern and distributed simulation concepts in LCM. A group of discipline specific computational 
models that have disparate temporal and spatial scales were linked together to study the multiscale 
and time-dependent interdependency during a series of seismic events that include short- and long-
term recovery processes. The time-dependent effects of resource allocation strategies on 
community resilience were investigated. It was noted that the analysis results could be used to 
assist decision-makers to determine emergency relief and post-disaster recovery policies. 
To address broader socio-technical considerations in resilience research and explore the 
coupling effects between civil and social systems from both hazards engineering and social science 
perspective, an agent-based computational model simulating benefit fraud behavior in the wake of 
disaster was created. The effect of both micro-level disaster demands caused by building damage 
and meso-level social variables on benefit fraud were considered. The statistical data from the 
government reports in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina and Rita was used for the calibration and 
validation. The proposed model, which includes a simulation environment of a community facing 
a natural disaster, fraudsters, and application inspectors, was then used to estimate the losses 
associated with these post-disaster crimes and their impact on community resilience. A parametric 
sensitivity analysis was performed to gain deeper insight into the benefit fraud problem. 
To provide a scalable, versatile, and user-friendly solution for natural hazards simulations, 
a new distributed computing software called Simple Run-Time Infrastructure (SRTI) was 
introduced. The high-level structure, data structure, and fundamental components of the SRTI were 
comprehensively described. The same case study of wind-excited buildings suffering progressive 
damage in Chapter 2 was conducted using an initial version of SRTI (v1.00.00) to demonstrate its 
capabilities and compare its performance to the case using LCM. Then, to reduce a user’s effort of 




version of the SRTI (v2.00.00) was designed and described. By means of the improved or 
additional pre-compiled components of SRTI v2.00.00, including the RTI Management Server, 
RTI Wrapper, and GUI, a cross-language simulation of time-dependent resilience analysis of an 
electric power system was conducted for showing its scalability and flexibility. The choice 
between different versions of the SRTI was discussed, and useful features to develop in the future 
were outlined. 
6.2 Conclusions  
Within the scope of the studies conducted in this dissertation, the following conclusions 
can be drawn: 
6.2.1 Distributed disaster simulation 
 Distributed implementation gives results similar to the traditional integrated application, 
but the computing efficiency may be traded off for distributed communication, including 
connecting to the server (for the SRTI), parsing data formats, setting up publish-subscribe 
relationships, and passing messages.  
 By modularizing each part of disaster as a simulator and using a publish-subscribe pattern 
for data management, the proposed distributed simulation frameworks have better 
modifiability, extensibility and scalability for modeling complex problems, such as hazard 
and resilience assessment of a community. 
 In the example selected, the communication time is about 1.5 times longer in SRTI 
v1.00.00 compared to LCM due to different data transmission mechanisms. However, 




not require recompilation when new simulators are added or data format changes, thereby 
significantly simplifying its deployment by non-specialized users. The employment of RTI 
Wrapper and SRTI GUI lowers the entry barrier and coding efforts for users with limited 
programming experience.  
 As a real-time data transmission solution for distributed computational simulations that 
supports time-dependent simulations, SRTI provides a unique service for researchers in the 
natural hazards field who seek to integrate a variety of simulators into overarching 
simulations of disaster scenarios to study these events and the subsequent recovery efforts 
unfold. The open source nature of SRTI’s code and design will encourage future 
improvement and optimization. 
6.2.2 Interdependencies in community resilience 
 The dynamic coupling behavior and interdependencies in disaster events can be simulated 
through either incremental-iterative or incremental analysis, depending on whether the 
computational results reach equilibrium within each simulation step through iterations. 
With a reasonable length of time step, these two analytical schemes yield similar results, 
but more computational studies of the effect of local iteration loops are required to explore 
the limits of simulation accuracy.  
 The computational results in Chapter 3 quantified the influence of the interdependencies 
between the lifeline systems on the resilience of the studied community. The results 
showed that the disaster-caused damage, operability loss, and required recovery time can 
be greatly underestimated if system interdependencies were not considered. It was also 




connectivity and damage states, could achieve better resilience performance. The impact 
of different resource allocation strategies was more significant when resources were 
insufficient.  
 The ability to handle differences in temporal scales between a hazard and the recovery 
process is one of the key advantages of the proposed simulation framework in Chapter 3. 
Aside from the capability of accounting for multiscale interdependencies, the case study 
pointed out the need of time-varying analysis as the interactions occur during hazard and 
recovery process.  
 The proposed agent-based methodology in Chapter 4 can capture the basic features of 
benefit fraud while producing sensible results. Due to lack of information about some key 
variables, which were assumed out of necessity, the simulation results are not truly 
predictive. However, it provides the ability to model post-disaster benefit frauds in detail, 
including the spatial and temporal nature of the criminal process.  
 From the simulation results, it is found that fraudulent activity occurs in three distinct 
phases in the aftermath of a disaster which matches the observations in actual disasters. 
The results of the ABM analysis also show that increasing the accuracy of review, 
decreasing disaster demands, and enhancing guardian strength can help lessen the loss due 
to post-disaster benefit fraud.  
6.3 Recommendations for Future Research 
The following research topics are recommended for future research in the area of 




 To better quantify the impact on society due to loss of lifeline serviceability, different 
indicators can be used to assess the system performance such as the actual amount of 
service flow and the number of people who are able to access to the lifeline systems service. 
The occupancy type of the demand nodes, e.g. hospitals and refugees, should be considered 
when deciding the priorities of system components to be recovered. These can be adopted 
into the existing framework once the information is available. 
 Through the addition of new simulators or the modification of the existing simulators, 
various types of recovery resources and possible recourse constrains can be considered in 
the future research, including the limited construction materials, available budget, and 
shortage of workers owing to injuries. The effect of delays due to bad weather conditions 
and traffic blockages on these recovery resources should be taken into account as well. 
Moreover, in reality, when decision makers make decisions such as recovery strategies, 
they may not be able to get comprehensive and accurate information in real time. Hence, 
the quality of information flow should be considered while doing time-dependent decision-
making simulations. 
 The damage assessment performed in this study are mostly based on computational 
simulation results or empirical data such as fragility curves. Yet, owing to the scalability 
and flexibility of the proposed distributed simulation framework, various damage detecting 
techniques can be applied. For example, the applications of machine learning techniques 
on post-disaster reconnaissance can be used to increase the reliability of simulation. In 
addition, a hybrid simulation of both virtual and real simulators can be conducted. By 
connecting the sensors on smart buildings and infrastructure to the current simulation 




 A higher-order parametric sensitivity analysis of the proposed agent-based model is needed 
in future studies to consider the interdependency existing between multiple independent 
variables. For example, it usually takes longer to review an application in order to reduce 
the judgement errors. However, it relies on more comprehensive data collection and further 
studies from the social science perspective to better understand these correlation effects.  
 Although a improved computational performance can be achieved by optimizing the 
SRTI’s implementation, users could also consider designing their simulation system in a 
parallel or time-sliced manner, which is similar to the concept of data “pipelining” in 
computer science. Rather than executing simulators in series, i.e. some simulators may be 
idling while the others are doing simulations, conducting a simulation with a certain degree 
of pipeline data pattern can better take advantage of distributed simulation by means of 











Table A-1. Demographics data in Shelby County retrieved from Hazus (2015)  
ID Population Male16to65 Households 
Responsible demand nodes 
EPS WDS NGS 
1 5394 2214 3054 P37 W29 G10 
2 1033 259 356 P37 W29 G10 
3 1060 314 380 P37 W29 G10 
4 1727 541 658 P37 W29 G10 
5 2152 665 885 P23 W29 G10 
6 4861 1325 1991 P23 W29 G10 
7 2684 677 992 P23 W31 G10 
8 2884 777 1148 P23 W31 G10 
9 3666 1250 1217 P22 W31 G10 
10 3733 1235 1457 P22 W31 G10 
11 3817 1129 1299 P22 W31 G10 
12 1648 525 631 P22 W31 G10 
13 1745 500 724 P20 W31 G10 
14 3158 1163 997 P36 W29 G10 
15 3848 1286 1666 P36 W29 G10 
16 1601 458 576 P37 W29 G10 
17 1969 539 677 P37 W29 G10 
18 1192 312 553 P37 W29 G10 
19 1839 708 688 P36 W29 G10 
20 2877 1019 1227 P36 W29 G10 
21 2511 918 1221 P36 W29 G10 
22 2018 633 710 P20 W31 G10 
23 3762 923 1492 P20 W31 G10 
24 4637 1505 2282 P33 W31 G10 
25 2938 778 1309 P20 W31 G10 
26 3410 1366 1709 P34 W31 G10 
27 3856 1440 2198 P34 W27 G6 
28 2141 787 1103 P34 W27 G6 
29 2099 950 1186 P36 W27 G6 
30 2996 1111 1470 P34 W27 G6 
31 2039 974 1024 P36 W27 G6 
32 1345 459 859 P36 W27 G6 
33 1048 532 800 P36 W29 G6 
34 1184 505 791 P35 W29 G6 
35 2348 1258 1622 P35 W29 G6 
36 1353 592 880 P35 W22 G6 




38 1498 378 634 P35 W27 G6 
39 1074 305 383 P35 W22 G6 
40 3945 1080 1483 P31 W22 G6 
41 2731 746 1025 P19 W22 G6 
42 3802 1025 1529 P17 W22 G4 
43 2633 813 955 P19 W27 G4 
44 1235 360 448 P19 W22 G6 
45 2730 821 1016 P19 W27 G6 
46 2030 580 794 P19 W27 G4 
47 2242 694 789 P34 W27 G6 
48 2405 931 1112 P34 W27 G6 
49 1585 467 677 P34 W23 G6 
50 2747 745 1064 P20 W23 G4 
51 2286 827 1172 P34 W23 G10 
52 3559 1014 1357 P20 W23 G10 
53 2538 729 984 P20 W23 G10 
54 3011 905 1116 P20 W23 G4 
55 3324 1155 1323 P20 W23 G10 
56 2549 762 1067 P20 W31 G10 
57 2322 838 1294 P20 W31 G10 
58 4127 1406 1488 P33 W31 G10 
59 3094 1490 1458 P33 W23 G10 
60 1581 440 600 P17 W27 G4 
61 2802 787 1161 P17 W23 G4 
62 5903 1307 2261 P17 W23 G4 
63 1681 498 650 P17 W22 G4 
64 5528 1505 2091 P30 W23 G10 
65 5174 1626 2085 P30 W23 G10 
66 2725 823 951 P15 W23 G4 
67 4393 1232 1893 P30 W23 G4 
68 4840 1485 1587 P30 W23 G4 
69 4116 1055 1827 P33 W31 G10 
70 5886 1819 2388 P33 W31 G10 
71 4768 1602 1961 P22 W31 G10 
72 6854 2295 2202 P22 W31 G10 
73 4078 1520 1333 P22 W31 G10 
74 2567 843 854 P38 W31 G10 
75 7200 2149 3174 P38 W31 G10 
76 4495 1470 2125 P30 W18 G10 
77 3128 1021 1605 P30 W18 G10 
78 6346 1988 2984 P32 W25 G7 
79 4830 1260 1990 P32 W25 G7 
80 2908 877 1006 P30 W18 G10 
81 3110 1005 1229 P38 W31 G10 
82 3783 1147 1372 P39 W33 G12 
83 2851 799 1034 P37 W33 G12 
84 7653 2007 2453 P41 W33 G12 
85 7191 1712 2358 P41 W33 G12 




87 5706 1479 1852 P41 W34 G12 
88 6810 1793 2314 P23 W34 G12 
89 1478 388 467 P41 W33 G12 
90 2413 665 778 P15 W19 G4 
91 7051 2183 2211 P30 W18 G4 
92 4026 1110 1386 P13 W18 G4 
93 4452 1316 1519 P13 W18 G4 
94 4831 1382 1513 P30 W18 G4 
95 3206 923 1187 P11 W18 G4 
96 5865 1673 1946 P13 W18 G4 
97 4146 1208 1473 P11 W18 G4 
98 4116 1077 1420 P15 W19 G4 
99 1615 525 659 P15 W19 G4 
100 1892 572 726 P22 W31 G10 
101 1720 501 692 P37 W29 G10 
102 1850 797 771 P37 W29 G10 
103 5954 3467 1543 P35 W29 G6 
104 2914 857 1132 P19 W27 G6 
105 2743 755 953 P35 W27 G6 
106 1693 400 578 P19 W22 G6 
107 5645 1763 1983 P30 W18 G10 
108 4676 1336 1526 P39 W37 G12 
109 3084 1003 1178 P42 W45 G12 
110 6292 2025 2217 P45 W46 G14 
111 2828 898 1094 P43 W39 G12 
112 3536 1018 1106 P44 W39 G14 
113 5393 1497 2292 P45 W44 G14 
114 1118 459 239 P45 W42 G14 
115 2128 610 793 P40 W34 G12 
116 5837 1531 2607 P40 W34 G12 
117 3693 905 1215 P40 W39 G12 
118 3547 837 1136 P40 W39 G12 
119 4909 1309 1543 P40 W34 G12 
120 5803 1582 1701 P25 W39 G14 
121 6290 1787 2222 P25 W39 G14 
122 5158 1419 1761 P25 W39 G14 
123 5313 1310 2179 P25 W35 G10 
124 4164 1155 1684 P38 W35 G10 
125 7124 2099 2868 P25 W35 G10 
126 4026 1141 1580 P25 W35 G10 
127 5522 1675 1955 P24 W35 G11 
128 3347 942 1233 P24 W35 G14 
129 2912 879 1162 P25 W35 G14 
130 2840 866 996 P24 W35 G14 
131 10075 3051 3217 P24 W40 G11 
132 8492 2593 3103 P25 W35 G14 
133 9469 2744 3384 P25 W35 G14 
134 6442 1870 2394 P25 W35 G14 




136 2584 779 924 P45 W41 G14 
137 3274 1038 1157 P26 W49 G13 
138 8206 2364 2798 P26 W36 G11 
139 3889 1182 1600 P24 W32 G22 
140 8393 2572 2825 P24 W35 G11 
141 9886 2867 3010 P26 W36 G13 
142 14912 4700 5590 P26 W32 G9 
143 6205 1891 2108 P21 W24 G8 
144 3713 1137 1306 P38 W35 G10 
145 6724 2119 2380 P24 W35 G10 
146 3877 1183 1391 P24 W35 G10 
147 4901 1495 2404 P24 W28 G10 
148 5626 1839 2300 P38 W28 G10 
149 7801 2369 3020 P24 W28 G10 
150 4375 1332 1901 P24 W28 G8 
151 4070 1455 1975 P24 W28 G10 
152 6334 1900 2734 P24 W30 G9 
153 4925 1497 1773 P24 W30 G9 
154 8037 2547 3381 P21 W28 G8 
155 3387 1058 1323 P21 W30 G8 
156 4263 1249 1420 P21 W26 G8 
157 4787 1564 2010 P21 W28 G8 
158 7301 2294 2764 P24 W30 G9 
159 3440 1027 1514 P24 W30 G9 
160 4526 3807 3 P38 W28 G10 
161 4778 1165 2218 P32 W25 G7 
162 2206 774 1229 P32 W25 G7 
163 5924 1581 2464 P32 W25 G7 
164 3247 899 1328 P32 W25 G7 
165 3993 1156 1585 P14 W25 G7 
166 3710 1061 1615 P14 W25 G7 
167 5055 1481 1920 P14 W17 G7 
168 9004 2906 3970 P14 W17 G7 
169 4726 1216 2130 P21 W26 G7 
170 6867 1876 2485 P21 W26 G7 
171 9295 2834 3046 P21 W26 G7 
172 2890 820 1199 P32 W25 G7 
173 3244 954 1334 P32 W25 G7 
174 4138 1216 1809 P14 W25 G7 
175 7992 2392 3238 P14 W17 G5 
176 10210 3157 3931 P12 W17 G5 
177 5361 1645 1838 P12 W26 G7 
178 11474 3447 3694 P12 W26 G7 
179 6111 1871 2141 P12 W26 G7 
180 4599 1395 1573 P12 W26 G7 
181 4644 1423 1510 P12 W26 G7 
182 3089 858 1120 P12 W17 G5 
183 3114 881 1230 P11 W18 G4 




185 2312 653 872 P14 W25 G5 
186 4073 1324 1931 P11 W18 G4 
187 4156 986 2145 P11 W18 G4 
188 2845 812 821 P11 W16 G4 
189 6966 2007 2551 P11 W16 G4 
190 7888 2263 2519 P11 W16 G4 
191 5879 1758 1946 P14 W17 G5 
192 7718 2243 2599 P14 W17 G5 
193 4588 1259 1791 P11 W17 G5 
194 4035 1188 1264 P11 W17 G5 
195 7066 2102 2320 P14 W17 G5 
196 4661 1325 1670 P14 W17 G5 
197 3323 941 1163 P11 W17 G5 
198 4736 1371 1610 P11 W17 G5 
199 5031 1467 1716 P10 W16 G4 
200 3377 916 1124 P16 W20 G4 
201 2757 836 978 P16 W20 G4 
202 3490 1038 1317 P16 W20 G4 
203 5742 1337 2166 P28 W20 G4 
204 6014 1659 2292 P28 W20 G4 
205 4436 1300 1594 P28 W16 G4 
206 3995 1104 1485 P28 W16 G4 
207 5920 1667 2079 P28 W16 G4 
208 4615 1236 1583 P29 W21 G6 
209 4099 1102 1507 P31 W20 G6 
210 5520 1316 1917 P29 W20 G6 
211 4052 1069 1475 P27 W20 G6 
212 4197 1170 1558 P27 W20 G6 
213 4744 1202 1611 P27 W20 G6 
214 6011 1690 2190 P27 W16 G6 
215 4641 1410 1697 P16 W20 G4 
216 3881 1072 1308 P13 W16 G4 
217 7166 1841 2488 P27 W16 G6 
218 63 47 1 P15 W19 G4 
219 3 1 1 P18 W21 G6 
220 0 0 0 P18 W21 G6 
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